Judgment date: 10 May 2023

The appellant, Jalla, owned land on the Nigerian coast which was subject to an offshore oil spill. They brought a claim in private nuisance against the respondent, Shell, arising from the spill and resultant devastating effect on their land.

The spill had been caused by a ruptured pipeline; the flow being stopped within hours.

The claim was issued within the six-year limitation period (Limitation Act 1980, section 2) but Jalla also sought to add a new claim after the limitation period had expired on the basis that the oil remained on their land and was not cleaned up. It submitted the nuisance was continuing, as was the cause of action and thus it was not caught by the Limitation Act 1980. This was successfully opposed on the basis the claim was now time-barred.

The judge at first instance and the Court of Appeal found there was no continuing nuisance. The cause of action accrued when the oil reached the shore / appellant’s land, which was a one-off event crystallising within weeks of the spill.

Jalla appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court provided general principles on the nature of a continuing nuisance; namely that it requires repeated activity by the defendant or an ongoing state of affairs for which the defendant was responsible, which caused continuing undue influence with the use and enjoyment of the claimant’s land. The continuing interference would have to go on day by day, or on some other regular basis, resulting in the cause of action accruing afresh on a continuing basis.

There was no such continuing nuisance here and the appellants were clearly incorrect in submitting there was. Such a conclusion would undermine the limitation period which could go on indefinitely until the oil was removed. It would also impliedly convert a claim for private nuisance into one of failure to restore the land.

There was no repeated activity by the respondent. The leak was a one-off event. The cause of action accrued when the appellant’s land had been affected by the oil, it did not continue so long as the oil remained on the land.

The respondent’s second reason in support of its position, that they had no control over the oil once it reached the shore, was given no weight by the Court. Control was not a necessary requirement for there to be a continuing nuisance as long as there was control when the nuisance was created, that would suffice, Thompson v Gibson 151 E.R. 845 [1841] 1 WLUK 304 applied.

The appeal was dismissed.