In Petrichor Energy FZCO v Bashar [2026] EWHC 914 (Comm) ('Petrichor'), Bryan J in the Kings Bench (Commercial Court) considered, at a without notice hearing (attended by the Applicant only), the law in respect to post judgment worldwide freezing orders. Under the heading 'The Freezing Order Application' and subheading 'The General Principles in relation to Post-Judgment Applications'[1], the Judge said, at paragraphs 49 to 52:

'The court will more readily grant a freezing order as an aid to enforcement of a judgment than on an interim application (see Babanaft International Co SA v Bassatne [1990] 1 Ch 13) per Kerr LJ at [37]:

“However, as a matter of discretion, such orders will in practice no doubt be made much more readily after judgment.”

The applicable principles were recently considered by Calver J in the case of Griffin Underwriting Limited v Varouxakis [2021] EWHC 226 (Comm) in which he stated at [29]-[34] as follows:

“29. I turn to the principles governing the granting of a worldwide freezing order. They are, of course, well known. The applicant must show: one, at least a good arguable case on the merits of its claim; two, that the defendant has assets; three, that there is a risk of dissipation of those assets, such that any judgment obtained by the applicant will go unsatisfied; and four, that it is just and convenient to make the order sought.

30. Before addressing each of those requirements, it is worth recalling the general approach to a freezing order which is sought after judgment has been obtained, such as in this case. The function of a post-judgment freezing order was restated in Emmott v Michael Wilson & Partners [2019] EWCA Civ 219 at 53, where Lord Justice Gross reviewed the earlier authorities and stated:

‘...post-judgment Mareva injunctions are granted to facilitate execution, by guarding against a risk of dissipation over the period between judgment and the process of execution taking effect, where the judgment would remain unsatisfied if injunctive relief was refused ... post-judgment Mareva injunctions can no longer be described as rare... Whether pre- or post-judgment, a Mareva injunction is not intended to confer a preference in insolvency and does not form a part of execution itself. Secondly, by reason of its nature and as a matter of realism, a post -judgment Mareva will increase the pressure on a defendant to honour the judgment debt. The mere increase in such pressure does not make it illegitimate or ‘in terrorem’.’

31. In this context, the authorities have repeatedly emphasised that a freezing order will be granted more readily after judgment than before, see Masri v Consolidated Contractors [2008] EWCA Civ 288 at paragraph 134.

32. There are a number of reasons for this. First, this reflects the policy of the law strongly in favour of the enforcement of judgments, which is based on the principle that justice requires that the court should be able to take steps to ensure that its judgments are not rendered valueless by an unjustified disposal of assets. Second, the existence of a judgment which has not been satisfied may make it easier to infer a risk of dissipation; third, it is sometimes the case that factors which are said to weigh against the making of a freezing order, for example delay or the absence of assets within this country and the presence of related proceedings in another jurisdiction, have less weight where judgment has already been obtained, see Great Station Properties v UMS [2017] EWHC 330 at paragraphs 61 and 63.

33. I turn next to the good arguable case on the merits. The first requirement of a good arguable case is necessarily satisfied where there is a judgment debt, see Great Station at paragraph 53:

‘It is unnecessary to establish that there is a good arguable case because the claimants have the benefit of an arbitration award and judgment in their favour.’

34. Here, Griffin has obtained the unsatisfied judgment, together with judgment on liability in relation to the remainder of its claim. So I consider that is easily satisfied.”

Whilst this is an area which does not appear to be fully developed in the case law, it appears that this requirement is more or less similar to the requirement on an interim application to show a risk of dissipation (see the judgment of Hamblen J (as he then was) in SPL Private Finance (PF1) IC Limited and 17 Others v ARCH Financial Products LLP [2015] EWHC 1124 (Comm).

Although generally there is no requirement that the Applicant provides specific evidence as to the existence of the Respondents’ assets and their location in order to obtain a WFO, a post-judgment injunction must be sought for a legitimate purpose - the ultimate collection of the debt. Therefore, there must be some prospect that the injunction will aid the judgment creditor in execution, as opposed to place illegitimate pressure upon him (see Masri (supra.) at [34]).'

Under the subheading 'The Requisite Elements', Bryan J said, at paragraph 53:

'As already quoted from the decision of Calver J in Griffin, the requirements are, in this context:

(1) Legitimate purpose/existence of assets;

(2) Risk of dissipation;

(3) Just and convenient; and

(4) Full and frank disclosure.'

Bryan J then went through each of these elements.

Element 1 

As to 'Legitimate Purpose/Existence of Assets' - Bryan J simply went through the facts of the application before him (there was no further law set out on this). On the facts in Petrichor, this element was satisfied. 

Element 2

Under the sub-subheading 'Risk of Dissipation', Bryan J said, at paragraph 55 to 59:

'The applicable principles in relation to risk of dissipation are well known. Two of the most well-known statements are those of Cockerill J in Petroceltic Resources Limited & Ors v David Fraser Archer [2018] EWHC 671 (Comm), and that of Popplewell J in Fundo Soberano de Angola v Jose Filomeno dos Santos [2018] EWHC 2199 (Comm) at [86]:

In the former case Cockerill J stated as follows:

“The principles which I now state can broadly be taken from those authorities, save where I say otherwise. Those principles are:

• The ultimate question is whether it is just and convenient to grant a freezing order, bearing in mind that it has ‘the nuclear effect of prohibiting the affected party from dealing with its assets’ and carries a reputational stigma.

• It is critical to remember the burden is on the applicant to satisfy the threshold for granting a freezing order and if an applicant has not adduced sufficient evidence, the application will fail.

• It follows that unless an applicant has made a prima facie case to support a freezing order, the claimant is not obliged to provide any explanation or to answer any questions posed.

• The applicant must prove a real risk supported by solid evidence that a future judgment will not be met because of unjustifiable dissipation by a defendant.

• Relevant factors in determining whether there is a real risk of dissipation include the ease with which any assets may be moved or disposed of, the defendant’s past or existing credit record or whether there is a history of default in honouring debts, the running up of liabilities and not paying them or incurring liabilities beyond the defendant’s means. Evidence of dishonesty or behaving within unacceptably low standards of commercial morality giving rise to a feeling of uneasiness about the defendant. (Bank and Clients Plc v King [2017] EWHC 3099, paragraph 5).

• Claims or even evidence of dishonesty by the defendant which may establish a good arguable case so far as the substantive case goes do not, by themselves, support a freezing order. The court must in each case ‘scrutinise with care whether what is alleged to have been dishonesty of a person against whom the order is sought in itself really justifies the inference that that person has assets which he is likely to dissipate and unless restricted’.

• If and to the extent the substantive claims cast any light on the risk of dissipation, the fact that a defendant has respectable defences to those claims has a bearing on the existence of a real risk of dissipation. (Linsen International Ltd and Others v Humpuss Sea Transport PTE Ltd [2010] EWHC 383 Comm at paragraph 71 by Christopher Clarke J).

• There is nothing implicit in complex off-shore corporate structures which evidences an unjustifiable risk of dissipation. It is not uncommon for international businessmen and, indeed, quoted UK companies to use offshore vehicles for their operations, particularly for tax reasons.

• The stable door point: that if there has been a real risk of the defendants unjustifiably dissipating their assets, it would have materialised by the time of the application is a ‘powerful factor militating against any conclusion of real risk of dissipation’.

• Even if a real risk of dissipation is established, considerations of confidentiality and commercial stigma and the impact on the defendant’s commercial interests can weigh heavily in any assessment of justice and convenience.”

In the latter case Popplewell J stated:

“(1) The claimant must show a real risk, judged objectively, that a future judgment would not be met because of an unjustified dissipation of assets. In this context dissipation means putting the assets out of reach of a judgment whether by concealment or transfer.

(2) The risk of dissipation must be established by solid evidence; mere inference or generalised assertion is not sufficient.

(3) The risk of dissipation must be established separately against each respondent.

(4) It is not enough to establish a sufficient risk of dissipation merely to establish a good arguable case that the defendant has been guilty of dishonesty; it is necessary to scrutinise the evidence to see whether the dishonesty in question points to the conclusion that assets are likely to be dissipated. It is also necessary to take account of whether there appear at the interlocutory stage to be properly arguable answers to the allegations of dishonesty.

(5) The respondent’s former use of offshore structures is relevant but does not itself equate to a risk of dissipation. Businesses and individuals often use offshore structures as part of the normal and legitimate way in which they deal with their assets. Such legitimate reasons may properly include tax planning, privacy, and the use of limited liability structures.

(6) What must be threatened is unjustified dissipation. The purpose of a freezing order is not to provide the claimant with security; it is to restrain a defendant from evading justice by disposing of, or concealing, assets otherwise than in the normal course of business in a way which will have the effect of making it judgment proof. A freezing order is not intended to stop a corporate defendant from dealing with its assets in the normal course of its business. Similarly, it is not intended to constrain an individual defendant from conducting his personal affairs in the way he has always conducted them, providing of course that such conduct is legitimate. If the defendant is not threatening to change the existing way of handling their assets, it will not be sufficient to show that such continued conduct would prejudice the claimant’s ability to enforce a judgment. That would be contrary to the purpose of the freezing order jurisdiction because it would require defendants to change their legitimate behaviour in order to provide preferential security for the claim which the claimant would not otherwise enjoy.

(7) Each case is fact specific and relevant factors must be looked at cumulatively.”

An applicant for a freezing order does not need to establish the existence of a risk of dissipation on the balance of probabilities. It is sufficient for the applicant to prove a danger of dissipation to the “good arguable case” standard (see Lakatamia Shipping Company Limited v Toshiko Moritomo [2019] EWCA Civ 2203 at [36]).

In this regard, I bear in mind the following points:

(1) The burden is on the Applicant to prove a real risk supported by solid evidence and judged objectively that the judgment will not be met because of unjustifiable dissipation by the Respondents.

(2) “In this context dissipation means putting the assets out of reach of a judgment whether by concealment or transfer.” (see Fundo Soberano (supra.) at [86(1)]).

(3) Unjustified dissipation also covers the dealing with of assets in such a way as to make enforcement of any award or judgment more difficult, unless those dealings can be justified for normal and proper business purposes (see the judgment of Flaux J in Congentra v Sixteen Thirteen Marine SA (The ‘Nicolas M’) [2008] 2 Lloyds Reports 602 at [49], as quoted by Haddon Cave J in AH Baldwin at [30]).

(4) “Evidence of actual dishonesty is not essential to the exercise of the jurisdiction, and there is no need to show an actual intention to dissipate assets...” (see the judgment of Haddon Cave J in AH Baldwin and Sons Ltd v Sheikh Saud Bin Mohammed Bin Ali Al-Thani [2012] EWHC 3156 (QB) at [31(3)]).

(5) “If there is a good arguable case in support of an allegation that the defendant has acted fraudulently or dishonestly, or with unacceptably low standards of morality giving rise to a feeling of uneasiness about the defendant (Thane Investments Limited v Tomlinson [2003] EWCA Civ 1271 at [28]), then it is often unnecessary for there to be any further specific evidence of dissipation for the court to be entitled to take the view that there is a sufficient risk to justify granting Mareva relief...” (per Haddon Cave J in AH Baldwin at [31(4)].

(6) A claimant need not prove that dissipation either has happened or will happen, but that there are objective facts from which a sufficient risk of it can be inferred (see Holyoake v Candy [2016] 3 WLR 357 at [20]).

(7) The fact a claimant has a claim which is unanswerable, or virtually incapable of being defended, may be a powerful fact in favour of granting a freezing injunction, though not of itself decisive (see AH Baldwin (supra.) at [31(7)] and [41]).

(8) In considering risk of dissipation by a company, the court is entitled to take into account the conduct of individuals who control the company (see Gee on Injunctions at paragraph 12-041 citing ArcelorMittal USA LLC v Essar Steel Ltd [2019] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 414 at [68] per Jacobs J).'

On the facts in Petrichor, Bryan J said, at paragraph 85:

'I am satisfied that there is, at the very least, a good arguable case of risk of dissipation'

Element 3

Bryan J then turned to element 3. Under the sub-subheading 'Just and Convenient'. Bryan J said, at paragraphs 86 to 88:

'I then turn to consider whether it is just and convenient to grant the relief that is sought.

As is well established, the “just and convenient” requirement is relevant to whether a freezing order should be granted and on what terms (see Holyoake v Candy [2017] 3 WLR 1131 per Gloster LJ at [45]).

Grant and Mumford on Civil Fraud (first edn., paragraph 28-059) identifies a series of non-exhaustive factors which are relevant to the question of whether it is just and convenient to grant a freezing order, and with which I agree. They are as follows:

(1) The strength of the underlying claim: the stronger the claim, the less “unjust” the order is likely to be because the defendant’s assets are more likely to be exposed to enforcement in due course;

(2) The size of the claim: a small claim is unlikely to justify the full panoply and substantial cost of a freezing order;

(3) Whether the injunctive relief sought will be effective and whether the cost of obtaining and enforcing it will be proportionate to the value of what is likely to be frozen;

(4) The potential disruption to the defendant’s business: it is well known that a freezing order can have a devastating impact on a company’s business or trade; and

(5) The conduct of the Applicant in relation to the application and the underlying claim: an applicant for injunctive relief must come to court with “clean hands.”

After going through the facts in Petrichor, at paragraph 89, relevant to element 3, Bryan J concluded, at paragraph 89:

'All those factors point to it being just and convenient to make the order sought pending a return date.'

Element 4 

Under the sub-subheading 'Full and Frank Disclosure', Bryan J went through points which could, on the facts, be argued by the respondents, on the return date, against making the post judgment (i.e. these were points raised by the Applicant, pursuant to its obligation, on a without notice hearing, to raise points which might militate against making the order). After considering the (fact specific) points, Bryan J concluded, at paragraph 99:

'I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant a worldwide freezing order post-judgment in the terms sought.' 

Though not referred to in Petrichor, on fair representation/full and frank disclosure, at a without notice hearing, see:

(1) Tugushev v Orlov [2019] EWHC 2031 (Comm);

(2) Gilbert v Broadoak Private Finance Ltd [2026] EWHC 153 (KB)

Collatory Case Series

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