Standing in s.994 Companies Act 2006 Cases (Collatory Case)

Author: Simon Hill
In: Bulletin Published: Saturday 25 April 2026

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In Bown v Shipley [2026] EWHC 918 (Ch) ('Bown'), HHJ Paul Matthews (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) considered the law in respect to standing to bring a s.994 Companies Act 2006 petition[1], at paragraphs 27 to 34. 

Before setting out those paragraphs, it might be helpful to set out some salient facts. 

Durley Farm Ltd (second respondent) was the subject company ('Durley'). Its shares were held (at least initially), 50/50, by 2 other companies. Mr Bown (petitioner) held the shares in one of these companies ('ENR'); Mr Shipley (first respondent) held the shares of the other company ('OCC'). There was a dispute as to whether ENR subsequently transferred its 50% shareholding in Dudley, to Mr Bown (paragraph 8)[2]. Durley, as will be apparent, could be seen as a joint venture of Mr Bown and Mr Shipley. Mr Bown and Mr Shipley had both: (a) been, at one time (at least), directors of Durley; (b) lent money to Durley. The intended purpose for Durley was for Durley to acquire certain agricultural land in Somerset with a hope to future development (paragraphs 1 + 8). After explaining the above, the Judge recorded:

'There is a dispute as to whether the petitioner now owns 50% directly....There is a further dispute as to whether the petitioner still is a director. But there is no doubt that the first respondent is currently running the company and the petitioner is not. The petitioner claims to have been unlawfully removed as a director and to have suffered other unfair prejudice to his interests as a member through the conduct of Durley’s affairs by the first respondent.' (paragraph 1).

Accompanying the s.994 petition, was an application by Mr Bown for interim injunctive relief. It was the application for interim injunctive relief, which the Judge was considering, and which resulted in the Bown judgment.

Returning to the law, under the heading 'Law', subheading 'Standing', said, at paragraphs 27 to 34:

'There are two matters of law with which I must deal. One relates to the question of standing in law to present a petition under sections 994-996 of the Companies Act 2006. Section 994 of the 2006 Act relevantly provides:

“(1) A member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an order under this Part on the ground—

(a) that the company's affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of members generally or of some part of its members (including at least himself), or

(b) that an actual or proposed act or omission of the company (including an act or omission on its behalf) is or would be so prejudicial.

[…]

(2) The provisions of this Part apply to a person who is not a member of a company but to whom shares in the company have been transferred or transmitted by operation of law as they apply to a member of a company.”

It will be seen that section 994(1) confers standing on “a member of a company”. As to this, section 112 of the Act provides:

“(1) The subscribers of a company's memorandum are deemed to have agreed to become members of the company, and on its registration become members and must be entered as such in its register of members.

(2) Every other person who agrees to become a member of a company, and whose name is entered in its register of members, is a member of the company.”

So, to be a member of a company, a person’s name must be in the register of members. That is the statutory register of members kept by the company under section 113 of the 2006 Act. It does not refer to any list maintained by the Registrar of Companies (ie at Companies House) under section 1080 of the Act. The petition complains that the petitioner was unable to change the record at Companies House because of the first respondent’s actions. Whatever the truth of that allegation, it is not relevant to the question whether the transfer has been registered in the company’s register of members. And the petitioner accepts that this has not happened.

Section 994(2) then extends the scope of section 994 beyond members, to persons “to whom shares have been transferred or transmitted by operation of law”. Transfer and transmission by operation of law are two separate events. As to transfer, section 770(1)(a) provides that a company may not register a transfer of shares (not being an exempt transfer under the Stock Transfer Act 1982 or under certain other regulations) unless “a proper instrument of transfer has been delivered to it”. The usual instrument is a stock transfer form. If the transfer is for a consideration, it must be stamped by HMRC before it can be presented to the company. The other event, transmission by operation of law, occurs when a shareholder dies and the shares vest in his or her personal representative. It also occurs when a shareholder becomes bankrupt and the shares vest in his or her trustee in bankruptcy. Neither of those possibilities is relevant here.

In Re a Company 003160 of 1986, Hoffmann J said this (at 99,279):

“In my judgment the word ‘transferred’ in section 459(2) [the forerunner of section 994(2)] requires at least that a proper instrument of transfer should have been executed and delivered to the transferee or the company in respect of the shares in question. It is not sufficient that there should be an agreement for transfer. This construction accords with the view expressed by Harman J in Re a Company No 007828 of 1985 (1986) 2 BCC 98,951.”

There is a further, negative point to standing. The petitioner in his petition does not claim to be a member of Durley, but does claim to be the “beneficial owner” of 50% of the issued shares in the company. This is because, although he does not hold shares directly in Durley, he owns all the shares in his company ENR, which is, or at any rate was, a 50% shareholder in Durley. In his view “beneficial ownership” of shares satisfies the requirement of being a member within section 994(1).

Unfortunately, the petitioner is simply wrong in law about this. Just because the petitioner owns shares in a company (ENR) which in turn owns shares in the company the subject of the petition (Durley), this does not mean that he is the owner, or even the beneficial owner, of shares in Durley. This is elementary company law, deriving from the legal rule that a company is a separate legal person from its members. A fortiori, it does not mean that the petitioner is the owner, or beneficial owner, of any asset of Durley, such as the agricultural land at Durley Hill. Contrary to what the petitioner claims in his email of 7 March 2026, no shareholder has any proprietary interest in any asset of the company merely because he or she holds shares in that company: see Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd [1925] AC 619, HL. This too is elementary company law. Coming closer to home, neither can a petition under section 994 be presented by a person with merely a beneficial interest in shares in the company: see eg Re HLHP Oriental Food Ltd [2025] BCC 1145, [40]-[74], and cases there cited. So, the petitioner has no beneficial ownership of shares in Durley merely by reason of the fact that he is a shareholder in ENR. But, even if he had, it would not have availed him.

However, there is also the question of an executed transfer of shares to the petitioner lodged with the company itself. This is relevant to the question of standing under section 994(2). I will assess this aspect later in this judgment.' [words in bold are in italics in original]

On the facts in Bown, in particular, the application for interim injunctive relief, the Judge held that he could not grant the interim injunctive relief sought, as the petitioner has no sufficient prospects of succeeding in showing standing to present the s.994 petition[3], and so the application was refused (paragraph 49)

(1) Form TM01 and (2) Form PSC07

Not relevant to standing, and so, a complete aside, but, readers might also be interested to read what the Judge said about what filing, at Companies House, a (1) Form TM01; and (2) Form PSC07, does, and does not do[4].

Collatory Case Series

The Collatory Case Series, is an series of bulletins, designed to report that one case which collates the essential principles/propositions of law, for a particular doctrine/area of law (and perhaps, sometimes, provide a few extra citations/quotations etc.). It is not designed as a deep and comprehensive review of an area of law, but to provide that quick 'go to' case.

SIMON HILL © 2026*

BARRISTER 

33 BEDFORD ROW

Simon Hill practices in the following areas: insolvency, company and business law, with some tax and property law.

Further articles on topics relating to his practice areas can be read under his Insights. Should you wish to instruct Simon Hill then please do not hesitate to contact his clerk Geoff Carr

NOTICE: This article is provided free of charge for information purposes only; it does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied on as such. No responsibility for the accuracy and/or correctness of the information and commentary set out in the article, or for any consequences of relying on it, is assumed or accepted by any member of Chambers or by Chambers as a whole, or the Copyright holder. No attempt has been made to provide an exhaustive review/account of the law in this area. *Copyright is owned by Barrister Search Limited.

[1] Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 appears in Part 30 of the Companies Act 2006. Part 30 is entitled 'Protection of Members against Unfair Prejudice', a part which contains sections 994 to 999 inclusive. Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 is entitled 'Petition by company member' and provides:

'(1) A member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an order under this Part on the ground-

(a) that the company's affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of members generally or of some part of its members (including at least himself), or

(b) that an actual or proposed act or omission of the company (including an act or omission on its behalf) is or would be so prejudicial.

(1A) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), a removal of the company's auditor from office-

(a) on grounds of divergence of opinions on accounting treatments or audit procedures, or

(b) on any other improper grounds,

shall be treated as being unfairly prejudicial to the interests of some part of the company's members.

(2) The provisions of this Part apply to a person who is not a member of a company but to whom shares in the company have been transferred or transmitted by operation of law as they apply to a member of a company.

(3) In this section, and so far as applicable for the purposes of this section in the other provisions of this Part, "company" means-

(a) a company within the meaning of this Act.'

It is helpful to also note the contents of s.996 of the Companies Act 2006, which is entitled 'Powers of the court under this Part'. Section 996 provides:

'(1) If the court is satisfied that a petition under this Part is well founded, it may make such order as it thinks fit for giving relief in respect of the matters complained of.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the court's order may-

(a) regulate the conduct of the company's affairs in the future;

(b) require the company-

(i) to refrain from doing or continuing an act complained of, or

(ii) to do an act that the petitioner has complained it has omitted to do;

(c) authorise civil proceedings to be brought in the name and on behalf of the company by such person or persons and on such terms as the court may direct;

(d) require the company not to make any, or any specified, alterations in its articles without the leave of the court;

(e) provide for the purchase of the shares of any members of the company by other members or by the company itself and, in the case of a purchase by the company itself, the reduction of the company's capital accordingly.'

[2] In Bown v Shipley [2026] EWHC 918 (Ch), HHJ Paul Matthews (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) discussed Mr Bown's (petitioner's) contention that ENR, had transferred to him, ENR's shareholding (50% of the shares in Durley Farm Ltd). At paragraphs 24 and 25, the Judge said:

'...each of the petitioner’s company ENR and the first respondent’s company OCC originally owned 50% of the issued share capital of Durley But the petitioner claims in his petition that there exists what he calls “a share transfer certificate”, by which ENR’s shares in Durley have been transferred to him. It appears that by this he means a stock transfer form. At the outset of the hearing the only evidence of such a stock transfer form was the assertion that one had been executed and was in existence. This was contained in the witness statement of the petitioner. But no other details were given. The evidence of the first respondent was that he had indeed been asked by the petitioner whether he objected to a transfer from ENR to the petitioner, and he said that he did not, subject to resolution of a matter pending at the Land Registry. However, in his evidence he denied that any such executed stock transfer form had ever been delivered to the company.

However, when this was debated during the hearing, the petitioner asserted once again in submissions that there was indeed an executed stock transfer form in existence. After the short adjournment, the petitioner produced what he said were copies of that stock transfer form, dated 21 July 2025, together with a copy of an apparent share certificate. The petitioner accepted, however, that the transfer had not been registered in the register of members of the company. He told me in oral submissions (though it is not properly in the evidence) that he thought that the stock transfer form had been sent to the company by post. However, in the petition and in the petitioner’s witness statement (which is evidence) the allegation is quite different. It is that the first respondent removed the online authentication codes that would have enabled the petitioner to change the entries in the online register kept at Companies House. As the petitioner says in his witness statement, “That transfer has not been registered at Companies House because Mr Shipley removed the Company’s authentication codes without board authority or my consent, making it impossible for me to file the transfer form at Companies House”.'

[3] In Bown v Shipley [2026] EWHC 918 (Ch), HHJ Paul Matthews (sitting as a Judge of the High Court), under the heading 'Discussion' and subheading 'Standing' said, at paragraphs 42 and 43:

'I assess the position as follows. On the allegations put forward here, the only way that the petitioner can have standing to present this petition is under section 994(2), on the basis that ENR’s shares have been transferred to him, and the completed stock transfer has been lodged with the company, but has not yet been registered. The petitioner says that that is what has in fact happened. The first respondent says on the other hand that it has not. I cannot resolve that factual dispute on this application. On this point I accept that there is a serious issue to be tried. But the petitioner needs to go further than this on this application, because he seeks such an intrusive interim order, with a heightened risk of injustice if wrongly granted.

The petitioner told me in oral submissions that he thought he had posted it to the company. But, although I have seen copy documents apparently amounting to a completed transfer form, there is no documentary evidence of their being sent to or lodged with the company, such as a posting receipt or a photocopy of the envelope addressed to the company. Moreover, and as I have already said, the allegation made in the petition is different. It is that the first respondent removed the online authentication codes that would have enabled the petitioner to change the entries in the online register kept at Companies House. But that is not what is required here. The petitioner will need at trial to show that the completed stock transfer form was lodged with the company. I do not have a high degree of assurance that the petitioner will succeed at trial on this point. Consequently, I cannot grant interim relief at all, as the petitioner has no sufficient prospects of succeeding in showing standing to present this petition.'

[4] In Bown v Shipley [2026] EWHC 918 (Ch), HHJ Paul Matthews (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) said:

(1) under the heading Form TM01, at paragraph 22 (Pearson May were the company's accountants):

'The first respondent caused Pearson May to file a form TM01 relating to the petitioner at Companies House on 19 June 2025. The petitioner says that this purported to remove him as a director. This is not correct, and displays a misunderstanding of the law by the petitioner. Form TM01 is a notification to the Registrar of Companies that a person has ceased to be a director. It does not have the effect of removing that person from office. Whether a person has ceased to be a director depends on other considerations, such as resignation or removal under the company’s articles, or expiration of a limited term of office. Article 5.1 of the articles (set out above) provides for the removal of a director who fails to attend board meetings for a certain period. The first respondent’s evidence is that the petitioner had indeed failed so to attend meetings, and was removed from office under that provision. The petitioner sought the removal of the TM01, and Companies House contacted the company to ask for information. Excello Law, a law firm, replied to Companies House explaining that this was the result of the application of the company’s articles, and Companies House responded to say that the TM01 would not be removed. I am in no position on this application to resolve that dispute, but it means that the filing of the notice by itself is of rather less significance than the petitioner attributes to it.'

(2) under the heading Form PSC07, at paragraph 26:

'On 9 March 2026 the first respondent filed a notice at Companies House in form PSC07 relating to the petitioner. Similar considerations apply to this notice as to the TM01 discussed earlier. The filing does not cause a person to cease to be a person with significant control. It simply notifies the registrar that that has already happened. This can be seen from the notice itself, which states that the date of cessation was 18 February 2026 while the notice itself was filed on 9 March 2026. The petitioner seemed to think that this removed some power or authority from him, but so far as I can see it it does not, and filing such a notice cannot unfairly prejudice the petitioner’s interests as a member. During the hearing I was told by the first respondent’s counsel that in fact the petitioner had never been a person with significant control, and the notice was filed to make this clear. This is supported by the fact that a similar notice, identical in all but the name of the person concerned, was filed on the same day in relation to the first respondent. In other words, no-one was considered to be a person with significant control in relation to the company. Moreover, the reference to a date of cessation exists because the form does not allow the person filing to say that the subject has never been a person with significant control, and requires a date of cessation to be inserted, which cannot be more than a certain amount of time from the date of filing.' [words in bold are in italics in original]