In R(O) Home Secretary [2023] AC 255 ('R(O)'), in the Supreme Court, Lord Hodge DPSC said, at paragraphs 29 to 31:

'The courts in conducting statutory interpretation are “seeking the meaning of the words which Parliament used": Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG [1975] AC 591, 613 per Lord Reid. More recently, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead stated: "Statutory interpretation is an exercise which requires the court to identify the meaning borne by the words in question in the particular context." (R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, Ex p Spath Holme Ltd [2001] 2 AC 349, 396.) Words and passages in a statute derive their meaning from their context. A phrase or passage must be read in the context of the section as a whole and in the wider context of a relevant group of sections. Other provisions in a statute and the statute as a whole may provide the relevant context. They are the words which Parliament has chosen to enact as an expression of the purpose of the legislation and are therefore the primary source by which meaning is ascertained. There is an important constitutional reason for having regard primarily to the statutory context as Lord Nicholls explained in Spath Holme, p 397: "Citizens, with the assistance of their advisers, are intended to be able to understand parliamentary enactments, so that they can regulate their conduct accordingly. They should be able to rely upon what they read in an Act of Parliament."

External aids to interpretation therefore must play a secondary role. Explanatory Notes, prepared under the authority of Parliament, may cast light on the meaning of particular statutory provisions. Other sources, such as Law Commission reports, reports of Royal Commissions and advisory committees, and Government White Papers may disclose the background to a statute and assist the court to identify not only the mischief which it addresses but also the purpose of the legislation, thereby assisting a purposive interpretation of a particular statutory provision. The context disclosed by such materials is relevant to assist the court to ascertain the meaning of the statute, whether or not there is ambiguity and uncertainty, and indeed may reveal ambiguity or uncertainty: Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Interpretation, 8th ed (2020), para 11.2. But none of these external aids displace the meanings conveyed by the words of a statute that, after consideration of that context, are clear and unambiguous and which do not produce absurdity....

Statutory interpretation involves an objective assessment of the meaning which a reasonable legislature as a body would be seeking to convey in using the statutory words which are being considered. Lord Nicholls, again in Spath Holme [2001] 2 AC 349, 396, in an important passage stated:

"The task of the court is often said to be to ascertain the intention of Parliament expressed in the language under consideration. This is correct and may be helpful, so long as it is remembered that the 'intention of Parliament' is an objective concept, not subjective. The phrase is a shorthand reference to the intention which the court reasonably imputes to Parliament in respect of the language used. It is not the subjective intention of the minister or other persons who promoted the legislation. Nor is it the subjective intention of the draftsman, or of individual members or even of a majority of individual members of either House . . . Thus, when courts say that such-and-such a meaning 'cannot be what Parliament intended', they are saying only that the words under consideration cannot reasonably be taken as used by Parliament with that meaning."

Obiter, reference was made to:

(a) 'principle of legality' (Lord Hodge DPSC in R(O), at paragraph 33)

(b) 'where a statutory power authorises an intrusion upon the right of access to the courts...' - that: '...it is interpreted as authorising only such degree of intrusion as is reasonably necessary to fulfil the objective of the provision in question' (Lord Hodge DPSC in R(O), at paragraphs 33; as per Lord Reed JSC articulated in UNISON [2020] AC 869, paragraphs 80 - 82)

In News Corp UK and Ireland Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2024] AC 89, Lord Hamblen and Lord Burrows JJSC (with whom Lord Hodge DPSC and Lord Kitchin JSC agreed), under the heading 'Domestic statutory interpretation: words, context and purpose; and “always speaking”', said generally, at paragraph 27:

'It is clear that the modern approach to statutory interpretation in English (and UK) law requires the courts to ascertain the meaning of the words used in a statute in the light of their context and the purpose of the statutory provision: see, e g, Quintavalle, para 8 (per Lord Bingham of Cornhill); Uber BV v Aslam [2021] ICR 657, para 70; Rittson-Thomas v Oxfordshire County Council [2022] AC 129, para 33; R (O) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] AC 255, paras 28–29.'

Lord Hamblen and Lord Burrows JJSC then focused on the principle that a statute is always speaking (typically). They said, at paragraphs 28 to 30:

'Within that modern approach, it is also a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that, in general, a provision is always speaking: see, e g, Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Security (“Royal College of Nursing”) [1981] AC 800; R v Ireland [1998] AC 147, 158–159; Quintavalle; Owens v Owens [2018] AC 899 (approving [2017] 4 WLR 74); Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Revenue and Customs Comrs [2022] AC 1. See also Greenberg (ed), Craies on Legislation, 12th ed (2022), ch 21; and Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Interpretation, 8th ed (2020), ch 14.

What is meant by the always speaking principle is that, as a general rule, a statute should be interpreted taking into account changes that have occurred since the statute was enacted. Those changes may include, for example, technological developments, changes in scientific understanding, changes in social attitudes and changes in the law. Very importantly it does not matter that those changes could not have been reasonably contemplated or foreseen at the time that the provision was enacted. Exceptionally, the always speaking principle will not be applied where it is clear, from the words used in the light of their context and purpose, that the provision is tied to an historic or frozen interpretation. A possible example (referred to by Lord Steyn in R v Ireland at [1998] AC 147, 158) is The Longford (1889) 14 PD 34 where the word “action” in a statute was held not to be apt to cover an Admiralty action in rem: at the time the statute was passed, the Admiralty Court “was not one of His Majesty's Courts of Law” (p 37).

The great merit of the always speaking principle is that it operates to prevent statutes becoming outdated. It would be unrealistic for Parliament to try to keep most statutes up to date by continually passing amendments to cope with subsequent change.'

Lord Hamblen and Lord Burrows JJSC then undertook in-depth review of some of the leading cases on the always speaking principle, at paragraphs 32 to 37. Lord Leggart, giving a concurring judgment, considered the 'always speaking' principle, at paragraphs 75 onwards.

Collatory Case Series

The Collatory Case Series, is an series of bulletins, designed to report that one case (or two cases, here) which collates the essential principles/propositions of law, for a particular doctrine/area of law. It is not designed as a deep and comprehensive review of an area of law, but to provide that quick 'go to' case.

Further reading

Lord Sales (of the Supreme Court), has written two papers (so extra-judicially) which readers might find interesting: (a) Statutory Interpretation in Theory and Practice (Talk to the Office of Parliamentary Counsel 20 March 2025), available here; (b) Purpose in Law and in Interpretation (F.A. Mann Lecture Herbert Smith Freehills 19 November 2024), available here.

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