Business Rates - Summons

Author: Simon Hill
In: Article Published: Thursday 06 February 2025

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Where a local authority (Billing Authority) in England alleges that a person has failed to pay due and payable national non-domestic rates ('Business Rates'), the Billing Authority may[1] apply by way of complaint ('Complaint') to the Magistrates Court (a justice of the peace), for a business rates liability order ('BRLO') against that person (the alleged ratepayer; for brevity - the 'ratepayer'). Accompanying the application by way of Complaint, will be a request to the Magistrates Court, that the Magistrates Court do issue a summons, directed to the ratepayer, requiring the ratepayer to appear before the Magistrates Court, to 'show why he has not paid the sum which is outstanding' (reg.12(2) of the Non-Domestic Rating (Collection and Enforcement) (Local Lists) Regulations 1989 (SI 1989/1058)).

This short article will consider the issue of the summons, and the procedural requirements for a summons, in light of:

(a) Non-Domestic Rating (Collection and Enforcement) (Local Lists) Regulations 1989 (SI 1989/1058) ('1989 Regs'), particularly, reg.12, entitled 'Application for liability order';

(b) The Magistrates Court Act 1980 ('1980 Act'), section 51, entitled 'Issue of Summons on Complaint'; and

(c) Magistrates' Courts Rules 1981 (SI 1981/552) ('1981 Rules'), particularly, reg.98, entitled 'Form of summons'.

A wider description of the Business Rates collection system in provided in a footnote[2].

Complaint

It may be helpful to briefly consider what a Complaint is first. The Complaint is: (a) a commencement of process document (akin to a claim form, or petition, or application); (b) it is, essentially, the set of proceedings; and (c) it is what gives the Magistrates Court jurisdiction to try the matter. In R. v Manchester Stipendiary Magistrate Ex p. Hill [1983] 1 AC 328 ('Hill'), in the House of Lords, Lord Roskill considered how the Magistrates Court gains jurisdiction through: (1) the making of a 'Complaint' (in civil cases); and (2) the laying of an 'Information' (in criminal cases). In relation to Complaints, Lord Roskill said, at 342:

'...in their civil jurisdiction, what a magistrates' court have jurisdiction to try is a complaint, and what is required to give them that jurisdiction is that a complaint has been made to them....their civil jurisdiction does not depend upon a summons being issued.'[3]

In Business Rates cases, the ratepayer will not see a Complaint document itself. There will be a computer generated bulk list document (cover sheet + schedule of entries), produced by the Billing Authority, containing tens, more usually, hundreds of entries[3a], but no individual complaint document created, for each individual complaint. In other words, there will be no document equivalent to a claim form in ordinary civil proceedings in the County Court or High Court, for each individual Complaint. The individualised/personalised document, is the summons, and it is this that is sent to the ratepayer.

Request for a Summons

With application for the Complaint, can (and in reality, will) come a request, and the issuing of a summons. Section 51 of the 1980 Act reads:

'Where a complaint relating to a person is made to a justice of the peace, the justice of the peace may issue a summons to the person requiring him to appear before a magistrates' court to answer to the complaint.'

In relation to Business Rates, reg.12(2) of the 1989 Regs enables a request to be made for the issuing of a summons, when the (application by way of) Complaint is made. Reg.12(2) states:

'The application is to be instituted by making complaint to a justice of the peace, and requesting the issue of a summons directed to that person to appear before the court to show why he has not paid the sum which is outstanding.'[4]

As Lord Roskill in Hill said, at 343:

'... if a summons is required the ... complaint must then be laid before a justice of the peace or before the clerk to the justices. This function of a justice of the peace or of the clerk to the justices in determining whether a summons should be issued is a judicial function which must, therefore, be performed judicially. This function, in my view, cannot be lawfully delegated to any subordinate. Section 1(1) of the Act of 1980 states the circumstances in which a justice of the peace (and now the clerk to the justices) may issue a summons and I respectfully agree with what was said by the Divisional Court in Reg. v. Brentford Justices, Ex parte Catlin [1975] Q.B. 455, as to the duties of justices of the peace and of clerks to justices before issuing summonses. Similarly, a justice of the peace or clerk to the justices must act judicially in considering an application for a summons following the making of a complaint: see section 51 of the Act of 1980.'

The Summons

The 1981 Rules contains r.98, in respect to the form of summons. Since 1.1.20, r.98 has read (so far as material[5]):

'(1) A summons requiring a person to appear before a magistrates' court may be issued in respect of more than one ... complaint.

(2) A summons must -

(a) state the name and address of the complainant...

(b) contain notice of when and where the person is required to attend the court;

(c) specify each ... complaint in respect of which it is issued;

(d) identify the name and address of the court office for the court that issued it.

(3) A summons need not bear the name of the justice or other person issuing it, provided that the designated officer has recorded the name of that justice or other person.'

This is less demanding/prescriptive than the former version of r.98, which applied up to 31.12.19[6].

As will be apparent, there are 3 parts to r.98:

(a) reg.98(1) - a permissive provision - expressly stating that the summons may be in respect to more than one Complaint. This is self explanatory and seems, in updated language, to be a close repeat of reg.98(3) in the prior version of this rule[7].

(b) reg.98(2) - a mandatory provision - prescribing mandatory contents for the summons. These are considered briefly below.

(c) reg.98(3) - a permissive / mandatory provision - permitting a summons to not bear the name of the justice or person issuing it, but (only) where the designated officer has recorded the name of that justice or other person. This is a marked change from the former rule, which required the issuing justice of the peace to: (a) sign it (electronic signature was sufficient); or (b) be named on the summons, with a clerk to the magistrates court signing the summons, authenticating the issuance.

Mandatory contents for the summons

There are 4 summons contents requirements (or 7 requirements, if you count the individual items required to be specified in the summons).

By analogy with the law in relation to council tax summons, particularly Williams v East Northamptonshire District Council [2016] EWHC 470 (Admin) ('Williams'), a summons is precluded from including information other than that required. To put this another way, '...the summons is not invalidated by reason of the inclusion of additional information beyond the subject matter of the complaint.' (Williams, paragraph 30)[8].

Service of the Summons

In 1989 Regs, reg.13 is entitled 'Liability orders: further provisions'. Reg.13(2) reads:

'A summons issued under regulation 12(2) may be served on a person -

(a) by delivering it to him,

(b) by leaving it at his usual or last known place of abode, or in the case of a company, at its registered office,

(c) by sending it by post to him at his usual or last known place of abode, or in the case of a company, to its registered office,

(d) where all or part of the sum to which it relates is payable with respect to a hereditament which is a place of business of the person, by leaving it at, or by sending it by post to him at, the place of business, or

(e) by leaving it at, or by sending it by post to him at, an address given by the person as an address at which service of the summons will be accepted.'

Service of summons is an integral part of the process. Indeed, the proper service of the summons is a pre-condition to the Magistrates Court having jurisdiction to make a BRLO. This is because, a BRLO can only be made if at least 14 days have passed, since the summons was served. This pre-condition is to be found in reg.13(2A), which provides:

'No liability order shall be made in pursuance of a summons issued under regulation 12(2) unless fourteen days have elapsed since the day on which the summons was served.'

SIMON HILL © 2025*

BARRISTER 

33 BEDFORD ROW  

NOTICE: This article is provided free of charge for information purposes only; it does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied on as such. No responsibility for the accuracy and/or correctness of the information and commentary set out in the article, or for any consequences of relying on it, is assumed or accepted by any member of Chambers or by Chambers as a whole, or the Copyright holder. No attempt has been made to provide an exhaustive review/account of the law in this area. *Copyright is owned by Barrister Search Limited.

[1] The Billing Authority can choose whether to bring proceedings for unpaid Business Rates, in one of two forums. Either: (a) Magistrates Court; or (b) a competent Court (i.e the High Court or County Court). The Billing Authority has the election. Typically though, the Billing Authority will issue in the Magistrates Court.

[2] Six authorities provide overviews of the system:

[1] In Chowdbury v Westminster City Council [2013] EWHC 1921, Aikens LJ have an overview on the process of obtaining a liability order:

'6…The Regulations for the collection and enforcement of business rates are to be found in the Non-Domestic Rating (Collection and Enforcement)(Local Lists) Regulations 1989 (“the Regulations”). These have been amended from time to time, both before and after 2010…

7 Under Part II of the Regulations, the local rating authority, known as “the billing authority”, will serve on a “ratepayer” a “demand notice” for the business rates payable in respect of a particular “hereditament”. Part III of the Regulations deals with enforcement if non-domestic rates are not paid by the ratepayer. Broadly, under Regulation 11 a billing authority has to serve on the person who is liable to pay the non-domestic rates a “reminder notice”. Then, under Regulation 12, if the non-domestic rates are not paid in the 7 days following service of a reminder notice, the billing authority may apply to a Magistrates' Court for an order against “the person by whom” the amount due is payable. This order is known as a “liability order”.

8 Regulation 12(2) and 12(5) provide:

“(2) The application is to be instituted by making complaint to a justice of the peace, and requesting the issue of a summons directed to that person to appear before the court to show why he has not paid the sum which is outstanding.

(5) The court shall make the order if it is satisfied that the sum has become payable by the defendant and has not been paid.”

9. The summons that is issued by the Magistrates' Court pursuant to Regulation 12(2) has to be served on the person who is to appear to show why he has not paid the sum outstanding. Regulation 13(2) sets out the possible methods of service of the summons. It provides:

“(2) A summons issued under regulation 12(2) may be served on a person–

(a) by delivering it to him,

(b) by leaving it at his usual or last known place of abode, or in the case of a company, at its registered office,

(c) by sending it by post to him at his usual or last known place of abode, or in the case of a company, to its registered office,

(d) where all or part of the sum to which it relates is payable with respect to a hereditament which is a place of business of the person, by leaving it at, or by sending it by post to him at, the place of business, or

(e) by leaving it at, or by sending it by post to him at, an address given by the person as an address at which service of the summons will be accepted.”

10. Regulation 13(2A) stipulates that no liability order shall be made pursuant to a summons issued under Regulation 12(2) unless 14 days has elapsed since the day on which the summons was served. It is therefore clear that service of the summons is a prerequisite to obtaining a liability order.'

[2] The Court of Appeal in R (on the application of Mathialagan) v Southwark LBC [2004] EWCA Civ 1689 ('Mathialagan'), set out the 'normal procedure' (at least in 2004), at paragraph 20:

'The normal procedure is as follows:-

i. The local authority is represented by the same person on each occasion. That person is not legally qualified but has been trained and has shadowed an experienced advocate. A typical hearing at the beginning of the financial year is concerned with up to 1,000 summonses. As the year progresses, and liability orders are made or debts discharged, the number of cases to be heard on each occasion diminishes significantly.

ii. The documents described below are prepared in advance of each hearing and accompany the local authority representative to court.

iii. There is the complaint which is computer-generated by the local authority, a copy of which is faxed to the court and returned by fax.

iv. There is a declaration that the relevant summons has been posted and the proof of posting itself.

v. There is then a very extensive court list which is prepared by the local authority and which is handed to the district judge or lay bench (each member of a lay bench receives a copy). A copy is also provided to the court clerk. The procedure is that the magistrate will make a manuscript endorsement on the right-hand of the list in respect of any case which does not result in a liability order being made that day or which carries any additional orders. For example, where a case is adjourned, the adjournment is endorsed or where a costs order which is less or more than the standard costs order of £100 is made, a specific endorsement is made.

vi. In a simple case, where a debtor does not attend, there has been no communication by the debtor and standard costs are awarded on the summons, the magistrate will make no endorsement. The right-hand of the list will remain blank.

vii. At the conclusion of the hearing, the bench members or district judge will return the list or lists to the local authority representative who will then telephone Liberata plc in order to confirm the outcome of each case which did not result in a standard liability order. For all cases where a standard liability order was made, a notification of liability will be automatically computer-generated and despatched by post that night (see pp. 35 and 36 of the appeal bundle). In all other cases, a letter will be drafted and sent to the debtor (see pp. 139 and 140 of the appeal bundle).

viii. The court list is then returned to the offices of Liberata plc and archived.

ix. The court list which is in the possession of the court clerk is endorsed in manuscript during the hearing by the clerk and is retained by the court and archived.

x. There is also an evidence list. This document summarises the dealings between the local authority and each debtor.

xi. There is further an extract from the valuation list which is a large compendium of all business rate valuations for properties in the borough. The extract will show the subject premises.

xii. There is a declaration of authority. In addition, the local authority representative is sworn at the commencement of each hearing, and there is a further form of authority which is recited in addition to the oath being given.

xiii. There is then signed by the district judge or magistrate at the conclusion of the hearing, a form of order in favour of LBS, but for the purpose of authorising a bailiff a liability order is drawn. This document is generated by the local authority's computer but is not sent to the debtor. It is only printed if a decision has been taken to instruct the bailiff and is used solely for the purpose of confirming to the bailiff that he has authority to act. It is printed off the local authority's computer system without any further reference.'

The Court of Appeal in Mathialagan then went on to criticise the blurred boundaries between Court and Billing Authority activities, at paragraph 21(ii):

'I find it very surprising that the only document with a court stamp (under xiii) is not produced by the court, but is created automatically by the local authority's software, even though the local authority is a party to the proceedings. (The example before us adds, under the court stamp, the words "Justice of the Peace for the area aforesaid (or by order of the Court Clerk of the Court)". The intended significance of these words is not clear to me.) This document apparently is used only for the purpose of confirming to the bailiff that he has power to act. However, for that purpose the rules require no more than "the written authorisation of the authority" (Non-domestic Rating (Collection and Enforcement) (Local Lists) Regulations 1989 r.14(5)). It seems both unnecessary, and wrong in principle, for it to be presented as though it had been stamped by the court. Nothing turns on this point in the present case, and we have not heard any submissions about it, but it seems to me an aspect of the procedure which merits reconsideration.'

[3] Henderson J in Dias v London Borough of Havering [2011] EWHC 172 (Ch) ('Dias') said at paragraphs 30 and 31:

'The procedure for obtaining liability orders is laid down in The Non-Domestic Rating (Collection and Enforcement) (Local Lists) Regulations 1989, SI 1989 No 1058. Part II of the Regulations provides for the service of written demand notices in each financial year, and for the payment of business rates pursuant to such demands. Part III then deals with enforcement. By virtue of Regulation 10(2), a sum which has become payable under Part II and which has not been paid shall be recoverable under a liability order, or in a court of competent jurisdiction, in accordance with Regulations 11 to 21. Regulation 11 provides for the service of a reminder notice, in addition to any notice required under Part II, before application can be made for a liability order. If the amount stated in the reminder notice is unpaid after seven days from its service, the charging authority may then apply to a magistrates' court for an order against the person by whom it is payable: Regulation 12(1). The application begins with a complaint to a justice of the peace, requesting the issue of a summons requiring the person concerned to appear before the court to show why he has not paid the sum which is outstanding: Regulation 12(2). Regulation 12(5) then provides that:

“The court shall make the order if it is satisfied that the sum has become payable by the defendant and has not been paid.”

When a liability order has been made, the authority may enforce it by distress ( Regulations 14 to 15 ) or by commitment to prison ( Regulations 16 to 17 ). In addition, by virtue of Regulation 18(1) :

“Where a liability order has been made and the debtor against whom it was made is an individual, the amount due shall be deemed to be a debt for the purposes of section 267 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (grounds of creditor's petition).”'

Later, at paragraph 37, Henderson J in Dias said 'it is true that the liability order procedure is of a relatively summary nature, but it still has the basic hallmarks of a judicial process, and it cannot in my judgment be stigmatised as inherently unfair.'

[4] In Tower Hamlets v Naris [2019] EWHC 886 (Ch), addressing an argument that the Magistrates Court liability order judicial procedure might not be human rights compliant, Chief Insolvency and Companies Court Judge Briggs said, at paragraphs 23 and 34:

'In Dias v The London Borough of Havering [2011] EWHC 172 (Ch) Mr Justice Henderson, as he was, provided a thorough analysis of liability order procedure and enforcement. He explained:

“It is apparent from the provisions cited above that liability orders can be made only after a fairly elaborate procedure has been followed, and the defendant has been given an opportunity to explain why he has not paid. The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that the sum has become payable, and that it has not been paid. If the defendant thinks that the order has been wrongly made, he is in principle entitled to challenge it either by judicial review or by an appeal by case stated. In the present case, however, Mr Dias took no active steps to present his case to the court, nor did he challenge or appeal against either of the liability orders.”

It is self-evident that the description of the liability order procedure given by Henderson J extinguishes any argument that such orders are made in contravention of Article 6. Mr Naris does not explain why the tribunal was not independent or impartial. He does not argue that it was not established by law. He does not explain why the public hearing was not fair other than to say that [the Hereditament] did not exist and therefore he was not served. In my judgment his argument that there was a breach of Article 6 is without foundation.'

[5] In North Somerset DC v Honda Motor Europe Ltd [2010] EWHC 1505, Burnett J gave an overview of the Business Rates system, but focused on the requirement to serve demand notices as soon as practicable after 1 April of the relevant year. Under the heading 'The statutory scheme for the collection of business rates', at paragraphs 9 to 23, Burnett J said:

'The system of business rates is governed by the Local Government Finance Act 1988 [“1988 Act”] and Regulations made under it. Those include the 1989 Regulations. The system has two broad parts. The first is concerned with the preparation, maintenance and alteration of rating lists. Such lists identify hereditaments (that is property on which rates must be paid) and rateable values. This aspect of the system is administered by the Valuation Officer, an official of HM Revenue and Customs, in the Valuation Office Agency (“VOA”). The second part is concerned with the recovery of rates in accordance with the rating list. That aspect of the system is administered by the billing authority for the statutory area concerned, in this case the Council, North Somerset District Council.

The 1988 Act introduced an important change in the nature of business rates. Whilst they continued to be charged on the basis of local valuations and were collected locally, money raised by way of business rates was transmitted to a central pool controlled by Central Government for distribution according to a statutory formula. The 1988 Act also introduced the highly controversial community charge in substitution for domestic rates.

The statutory obligation on the VOA to maintain “local non-domestic rating lists” is found in Section 41(1) of the 1988 Act. The first list was required to be compiled on 1st April 1990 with subsequent lists being compiled on 1st April at the end of each five year period thereafter. This case is primarily concerned with the 2000 rating list. The content of local lists is specified by Section 42 of the 1988 Act. Section 43(1) governs liability to pay business rates. It provides:

“43 Occupied hereditaments liability

(1) A person (the ratepayer) shall as regards a hereditament be subject to a non-domestic rate in respect of a chargeable financial year if the following conditions are fulfilled in respect of any day in the year-

(a) on the day the ratepayer is in occupation of all or part of the hereditament, and

(b) the hereditament is shown for the day in a local non-domestic rating list in force for the year.”

Section 43 makes further provision for the calculation of the business rates to which the ratepayer will be subject.

Section 43 does not itself give rise to a duty to pay the rates to which the ratepayer is subject. That duty arises only following service of a notice under the 1989 Regulations.

Section 45 deals with liability for business rates on unoccupied premises (material in Mr. Graham's case). Subject to refinements to which it will be necessary to return when considering the facts of that case, the broad scheme at the material time was that the owners of unoccupied business premises were liable for 50% of the liability calculated pursuant to Section 43. The position has since changed.

Section 49 provides express statutory provision for a billing authority to reduce any amount a person is liable to pay under Section 43 or Section 45, or to remit the payment of the whole amount, if the authority is satisfied that the ratepayer would sustain hardship if such steps were not taken and it is reasonable to do so “having regard to the interests of persons liable to pay council tax set by it”.

Schedule 8 concerns the pooling of business rates, that is collection by Central Government of business rates through billing authorities. The approach to contributions required from billing authorities to Central Government is found in paragraph 4 of Schedule 8 of the 1988 Act which provides, as material, as follows:

(1) The Secretary of State may make regulations containing rules for the calculation of an amount for a chargeable financial year in relation to each billing authority (to be called its non domestic rating contribution for the year).

(2) The Rules shall be so framed that the amount calculated under them in relation to an authority is broadly the same as the total which, if the authority acted diligently, would be payable to it in respect of the year under Sections 43 and 45 above.”

The basic structure of the contribution system, which is subject to much further refinement in Schedule 8 itself and Regulations made thereunder, ensures that a billing authority pays to the central pool a sum equivalent to what ought to have been collected, assuming the billing authority had acted diligently, rather than any lesser sum actually collected.

Schedule 9 is concerned with “non-domestic rating administration”. It is given effect by Section 62 which provides:

“Schedule 9 below (which contains provisions about administration, including collection and recovery) shall have effect.”

Paragraph 1 of Schedule 9 enables the Secretary of State to make regulations containing “such provision that he sees fit in relation to the collection and recovery of amounts persons are liable to pay” in business rates. Paragraph 2(2) empowers the Secretary of State to make regulations which, amongst other things, concern the form and content of notices which specify the amount to be paid. The provisions in sub paragraph (2) originally included:

“(e) that the payee must serve a notice or notices on the ratepayer stating the amount payable or its estimated amount and what payment or payments he is required to make (by way of instalment or otherwise),

(f) that no payment on account of the amount payable need be made unless a notice requires it,

(g) that a notice and any requirement in it is to be treated as invalid if it contains prescribed matters or fails to contain other prescribed matters or is not in a prescribed form.”

This was the original form of paragraph 2(e) to (g). It is of note that sub-paragraph 2(g) empowered the Secretary of State to make regulations which specified that a notice that failed to contain prescribed matters was invalid. It was thus anticipated that absent such specification, the defective notice would not be automatically invalid. There was no express power to make a regulation specifying that a failure to comply with a time limit for serving a notice should result in invalidity. The power to make express provision for invalidity of defective notices itself begs the question whether that invalidity could be cured by serving a fresh notice which was compliant. Schedule 9 paragraph 2 was amended by the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 by substituting a new paragraph 2(g), together with paragraphs (ga) to (ge). They provide part of the answer:

“(g) that a notice must be in a prescribed form, (ga) that a notice must contain prescribed matters,

(gb) that a notice must not contain other prescribed matters,

(gc) that where a notice is invalid because it does not comply with regulations under paragraph (g) or (ga) above, and the circumstances are such as may be prescribed, a requirement contained in the notice by virtue of regulations under paragraph (e) or (f) above shall nevertheless have effect as if the notice were valid,

(gd) that where a notice is invalid because it does not comply with regulations under paragraph (g) above, and a requirement has effect by virtue of regulations under paragraph (gc) above, the payee must take prescribed steps to issue to the ratepayer a document in the form which the notice would have taken had it complied with regulations under paragraph (g) above,

(ge) that where a notice is invalid because it does not comply with regulations under paragraph (ga) above, and a requirement has effect by virtue of regulations under paragraph (gc) above, the payee must take prescribed steps to inform the ratepayer of such of the matters prescribed under paragraph (ga) above as were not contained in the notice.”

This alteration to Schedule 9 paragraph 2 demonstrates that Parliament considered that a notice which was not in the prescribed form, or failed to contain prescribed matters, would be invalid in some circumstances. Nonetheless, the purpose of paragraphs (gc) to (ge) is to enable arrangements to be put in place to ensure that the rates are paid. The underlying intention was that technical failings should not necessarily result in total invalidity. The Schedule remains silent on the question of invalidity for failure to comply with a time limit.

Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Schedule 9 enable the Secretary of State to lay Regulations making provision for the recovery of unpaid business rates by way of a liability order in the Magistrates Court (with distress, committal to prison, bankruptcy and winding-up proceedings to follow) or in a court of competent jurisdiction. Paragraph 7 of Schedule 9 is also of note. It confers a power of entry on a Valuation Officer for the purposes of discharging his functions under the legislation, but not on the billing authority. This is a feature of the scheme which Mr. Drabble relied upon in support of a submission that the task of a billing authority in identifying the occupier of premises, and thus the person to whom a notice should be sent, was far from easy.

The 1989 Regulations were made under Schedule 9 and Section 62. Part 2 of the 1989 Regulations are concerned with “billing”. Regulations 4 and 5 are as follows:

4.- The requirement for demand notices

(1) For each chargeable financial year a billing authority shall, in accordance with regulations 5 to 7, serve a notice in writing on every person who is a ratepayer of the authority in relation to the year.

(2) Different demand notices shall be served for different chargeable financial years.

(3) A demand notice shall be served with respect to the amount payable for every hereditament as regards which a person is a ratepayer of the authority, though a single notice may relate to the amount payable with respect to more than one such hereditament.

(4) If a single demand notice relates to the amount payable with respect to more than one hereditament, subject to paragraphs 5 and 8 of Schedule 1 the amounts due under it, and the times at which they fall due, shall be determined as if separate notices were issued in respect of each hereditament.

5.- Service of demand notices

(1) Subject to paragraph (2), a demand notice shall be served on or as soon as practicable after–

(a) except in a case falling within sub-paragraph (b), 1st April in the relevant year, or

(b) if the conditions mentioned in section 43(1) or 45(1) of the Act are not fulfilled in respect of that day as regards the ratepayer and the hereditament concerned, the first day after that day in respect of which such conditions are fulfilled as regards them.

(2) Subject to paragraph (3), a demand notice may, if the non-domestic multiplier for the relevant year has been determined or set under Schedule 7 to the Act, be served before the beginning of the relevant year on a person with respect to whom on the day it is issued it appears to the billing authority that the conditions mentioned in section 43(1) or 45(1) of the Act are fulfilled (or would be fulfilled if a list sent under section 41(5) of the Act were in force) as regards the hereditament to which it relates; and if it is so served, references in this Part to a ratepayer shall, in relation to that notice and so far as the context permits, be construed as references to that person.

(3) A demand notice shall not be served before the authority has set amounts for the relevant year under section 30 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992.”

It is common ground before me that no duty on the ratepayer to discharge his rates liability arises until a notice has been served under Regulation 5. There is thus, within the statutory scheme, a clear distinction between the liability for business rates created by Section 43, on the one hand, and the obligation to discharge that liability after service of a notice under the 1989 Regulations.

Regulation 12 and following are concerned with recovery of outstanding rates through the Magistrates Court or a court of competent jurisdiction, together with the ancillary enforcement procedures if a liability order made in the Magistrates Court is not satisfied. Finally, I should mention Regulation 23(1) which provides “any matter which could be the subject of an appeal under Regulations under Section 55 of the Act may not be raised in proceedings under this part”.

Section 55 of the 1988 Act (together with Regulations made thereafter) is concerned with alteration of lists. There are mechanisms which allow the owners and occupiers of a hereditament to dispute the content of the list. Notably, the rateable value set out in the list, upon which any notice served under the 1989 Regulations would be based, may be disputed. On various bases it might be suggested that the hereditament should be deleted from the list altogether or that other changes should be made. The statutory route of challenge in those circumstances involves first a proposal to the VOA with statutory rights of appeal to a Tribunal thereafter. The effect of Regulation 23(1) of the 1989 Regulations is to deny a ratepayer the opportunity to take a point to defeat enforcement proceedings which could have been raised by way of a statutory appeal.

The mechanisms for altering a list which are of relevance for the arguments advanced in this case are the mechanisms in respect of the 1995 and 2000 lists that were engaged on and after 1st April 2005. The VOA has power to alter the valuation list pursuant to its duty to maintain an accurate list. It also has power to alter the rating list pursuant to a proposal, and may be required to do so by a decision of a tribunal or court.

The VOA's direct powers arise under section 41 of the 1988 Act. Section 41(7) provides that:

‘A list must be maintained for as long as is necessary for the purposes of this Part, so that the expiry of the five year period for which it is in force does not detract from the duty to maintain it.’

However, by virtue of subordinate regulations the last effective date on which the VOA could make an alteration to the 2000 list was 31st March 2006: see the Non-Domestic Rating (Alteration of List and Appeals) Regulations 1993 (SI 1993/2911) [“the 1993 Regulations”]. Until that date, anyone (including a ratepayer) could have drawn an error to the attention of the VOA. If it was accepted as such by that date, the VOA could alter the list. Various protections operate in favour of those who might be adversely affected by such a unilateral change.

That power stands in contrast with the procedure which enables ratepayers to make proposals for the alteration of the list. Regulation 4C of the 1993 Regulations establishes a general rule that a proposal to alter the 2000 list could be made at any time before 1st April 2005. Whilst there are exceptions to that time limit, they do not apply in respect of any of the three defendants in these proceedings. That is a position accepted by the Council. In all three cases before the Court, the 2000 rating list was closed to proposals from 1st April 2005.'

[6] In Total Sprint Limited v Swale Borough Council [2023] EWHC 2968 (Admin); [2024] 1 WLR 1687, Eyre J said, under the heading 'The Legislative Framework', at paragraphs 11 to 19:

'11. The Local Government Finance Act 1988 makes provision for non-domestic rates and the 1989 Regulations were made pursuant to Schedule 9 of that Act.

12. The liability to pay non-domestic rates depends on rateable occupation of the premises in question. The four ingredients of rateable occupation are that there is actual occupation; that this is occupation which is exclusive for the particular purposes of the possessor; that the possession is of some value or benefit to the possessor; and that the possession is not too transient ( Cardtronics Europe Ltd v Sykes [2020] UKSC 21, [2020] 1 WLR 2184 at [13] approving the classic formulation of Tucker LJ).

13. The following provisions of the 1989 Regulations are of note.

14. Regulation 3(1) defines "the amount payable" thus:

"(a) the amount the ratepayer is liable to pay to the authority as regards the hereditament in respect of the year or part under —

(i) section 43 or 45 of the Act, whether calculated by reference to section 43(4) to (6) or 45(4) or (4A) of the Act (as those provisions are amended or substituted in any case by or under Schedule 7A to the Act ) or by reference to an amount or rules determined or prescribed under section 47(1)

(a), 57A(3)(a) or 58(3)(a) of the Act ; and

(ii) section 11 of the BRS Act, whether calculated by reference to section 13 of the BRS Act (chargeable amount) or determined in accordance with rules set by the levying authority under section 15 of the BRS Act (BRS relief); or

(b) where an amount falls to be credited by the billing authority against the ratepayer's liability in respect of the year or part, the amount (if any) by which the amount referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above exceeds the amount falling to be so credited;"

15. Regulations 4 and 5 provide respectively for demand notices and for their service.

16. Regulation 8 addresses a failure to pay by instalments with sub-regulations (1) and (2) providing thus:

"(1) Where -

(a) a demand notice has been served by a [billing authority] on a ratepayer,

(b) instalments are payable under the notice in accordance with [Schedules 1 or 1E] [or 1F], and

(c) any such instalment is not paid in accordance with [Schedules 1 or 1E] [or 1F], the [billing authority] shall (unless all the instalments have fallen due) serve a further notice on the ratepayer stating the instalments required to be paid.

(2) If, after the service of a further notice under paragraph (1), the ratepayer –

(a) fails to pay, before the expiry of the period of 7 days beginning with the day of service of the further notice, any instalments which fall due before the expiry of that period under the demand notice concerned, or

(b) fails to pay any instalment which falls due after the expiry of that period under the demand notice concerned on or before the day on which it so falls due, the unpaid balance of the estimated amount shall become payable by him at the expiry of a further period of 7 days beginning with the day of the failure.

…"

17. Regulation 10 defines a liability order as an order made under regulation 12.

18. Regulation 11 makes the following provision for reminder notices:

"(1) Subject to paragraph (3), before a [billing authority] applies for a liability order it shall serve on the person against whom the application is to be made a notice ("reminder notice"), which is to be in addition to any notice required to be served under Part II and which is to state every amount in respect of which the authority is to make the application.

(2) A reminder notice may be served in respect of an amount at any time after it has become due.

(3) A reminder notice need not be served on a person who has been served under regulation 8(1) with a notice in respect of the amount concerned where there has been such a failure as is mentioned in regulation 8(2)(a) in relation to the notice."

19. Then regulation 12 provides:

"(1) Subject to paragraph (3), if an amount which has fallen due under regulation 8(2) in consequence of such a failure as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) of that provision is wholly or partly unpaid, or (in a case where a reminder notice is required under regulation 11) the amount stated in the reminder notice is wholly or partly unpaid at the expiry of the period of 7 days beginning with the day on which the notice was served, the [billing authority] may, in accordance with paragraph (2), apply to a magistrates' court for an order against the person by whom it is payable.

(2) The application is to be instituted by making complaint to a justice of the peace, and requesting the issue of a summons directed to that person to appear before the court to show why he has not paid the sum which is outstanding.

(3) Section 127(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 does not apply to such an application; but no application may be instituted in respect of a sum after the period of 6 years beginning with the day on which it became due under Part II.

(4) A warrant shall not be issued under section 55(2) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 in any proceedings under this regulation.

(5) The court shall make the order if it is satisfied that the sum has become payable by the defendant and has not been paid.

(6) [An order made pursuant to paragraph (5) shall] be made in respect of an amount equal to the aggregate of –

(a) the sum payable, and

(b) a sum of an amount equal to the costs reasonably incurred by the applicant in obtaining the order.

(7) Where the sum payable is paid after a liability order has been applied for under paragraph (2) but before it is made, the court shall nonetheless (if so requested by the [billing authority]) make the order in respect of a sum of an amount equal to the costs reasonably incurred by the authority in making the application."

Separately, rateable valuation revaluations have taken place in England and Wales, generally, on a 5 yearly cycle (i.e. quinquennially). Namely, in:

(1) 1956

(2) 1963

(3) 1973

(4) 1990;

(5) 1995;

(6) 2000;

(7) 2005;

(8) 2010;

(9) 2017 (it should have occurred in 2015 on the 5 yearly cycle, but it was delayed);

(10) 2023 (the most recent revaluation)(5 years after 2017 would have been 2022; this was 6 years after 2017)

[3] In R. v Manchester Stipendiary Magistrate Ex p. Hill [1983] 1 AC 328 Lord Roskill also:

(a) said that the making of the Complaint is a matter for the Complainant (here, the Billing Authority). Lord Roskill said, at 342:

'My Lords, it is of crucial importance to appreciate that the laying of an information is a matter for the prosecution just as the making of a complaint is a matter for the complainant. In each case it is for the prosecutor or the complainant to decide how the information or how the complaint shall be formulated.'

(b) considered what amounts to making a Complaint (and Information). Lord Roskill said, at 342/343:

'The laying of an information before or the making of a complaint to a justice of the peace or the clerk to the justices to my mind means, in reference to a written information or complaint, procuring the delivery of the document to a person authorised to receive it on behalf of the justice of the peace and the clerk to the justices. The acts of delivery and receipt are ministerial, and I see no reason why the justices of the peace or the clerks to the justices should not delegate to an appropriate subordinate authority to receive the information which the prosecutor desires to deliver. It can sensibly be inferred that any member of the staff in the office of the clerk to the justices authorised to handle incoming post has such authority. Accordingly, once the information has been received at the office of the clerk to the justices, which today in most cases is likely to be at the magistrates' court house, the information will, in my view, have been laid. No more is required of the prosecutor to launch the intended criminal proceedings. Similarly with a complaint - once the complaint is received at the office of the clerk to the justices no more is required of the complainant.

What happens thereafter is not within the province of the prosecutor or of the complainant but of the court....'

(c) later, at 346, said:

'I would add that it is not necessary for the information to be personally received by a justice of the peace or by the clerk to the justices. It is enough that it is received by any member of the staff of the clerk to the justices, expressly or impliedly authorised to receive it, for onward transmission to a justice of the peace or to the clerk to the justices. The same applies to the making of a complaint.'

[3a] In Williams v East Northamptonshire District Council [2016] EWHC 470 (Admin), a Case Stated appeal in a council tax liability order case, Mr Alexander Nissen QC (sitting as a deputy High Court Judge) gave a brief description of the computer generated bulk list document, at paragraphs 12 to 13:

'In this case, the [Billing Authority] issued a complaint on or around 15 July 2015, in the following material terms:

“The complaint of the Billing Authority BY L HOGSTON, BENEFIT MANAGER of East Northamptonshire District Council who states that the several persons given in the Schedule below are persons properly liable to pay Council Tax in the sum(s) opposite to their respective names and who have not paid the sum(s) set out or any part thereof.”

The Schedule described in the complaint is a computer-generated print out and, on this occasion, included the name of the Appellant. Against his name is described the sum payable, namely £975.26, and, separately, costs of £75. The aggregate figure of £1,050.26 is also given. The Appellant sought to take issue with the legal validity of the complaint but that was outside the scope of this appeal.

[4] Non-Domestic Rating (Collection and Enforcement) (Local Lists) Regulations 1989 (SI 1989/1058) ('1989 Regs'), reg.12 (business rates) is very similar to its equivalent for council tax, namely reg.34 of the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992/613 ('1992 Regs'). Reg.34 of the 1992 Regs is entitled 'Application for liability order' and reg.34(2) reads:

'The application is to be instituted by making complaint to a justice of the peace, and requesting the issue of a summons directed to that person to appear before the court to show why he has not paid the sum which is outstanding.'

For those interested, the similarities stretch throughout reg.12 of the 1989 Regs and reg.34 of the 1992 Regs:

[1] reg.34 of the 1992 Regs reads:

'(1) If an amount which has fallen due under paragraph (3) or (4) of regulation 23 (including those paragraphs as applied as mentioned in regulation 28A(2) ) is wholly or partly unpaid, or (in a case where a final notice is required under regulation 33 ) the amount stated in the final notice is wholly or partly unpaid at the expiry of the period of 7 days beginning with the day on which the notice was issued, the billing authority may, in accordance with paragraph (2), apply to a magistrates' court for an order against the person by whom it is payable.

(2) The application is to be instituted by making complaint to a justice of the peace, and requesting the issue of a summons directed to that person to appear before the court to show why he has not paid the sum which is outstanding.

(3) Section 127(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 does not apply to such an application; but no application may be instituted in respect of a sum after the period of six years beginning with the day on which it became due under Part V.

(4) A warrant shall not be issued under section 55(2) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 in any proceedings under this regulation.

(5) If, after a summons has been issued in accordance with paragraph (2) but before the application is heard, there is paid or tendered to the authority an amount equal to the aggregate of–

(a) the sum specified in the summons as the sum outstanding or so much of it as remains outstanding (as the case may be); and

(b) a sum of an amount equal to the costs reasonably incurred by the authority in connection with the application up to the time of the payment or tender,

the authority shall accept the amount and the application shall not be proceeded with.

(6) The court shall make the order if it is satisfied that the sum has become payable by the defendant and has not been paid.

(7) An order made pursuant to paragraph (6) shall be made in respect of an amount equal to the aggregate of–

(a) the sum payable, and

(b) a sum of an amount equal to the costs reasonably incurred by the applicant in obtaining the order.

(8) Where the sum payable is paid after a liability order has been applied for under paragraph (2) but before it is made, the court shall nonetheless (if so requested by the billing authority) make the order in respect of a sum of an amount equal to the costs reasonably incurred by the authority in making the application.'

[2] This can be compared with reg.12 of the 1989 Regs, which reads:

'(1) Subject to paragraph (3), if an amount which has fallen due under regulation 8(2) in consequence of such a failure as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) of that provision is wholly or partly unpaid, or (in a case where a reminder notice is required under regulation 11) the amount stated in the reminder notice is wholly or partly unpaid at the expiry of the period of 7 days beginning with the day on which the notice was served, the billing authority may, in accordance with paragraph (2), apply to a magistrates' court for an order against the person by whom it is payable.

(2) The application is to be instituted by making complaint to a justice of the peace, and requesting the issue of a summons directed to that person to appear before the court to show why he has not paid the sum which is outstanding.

(3) Section 127(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 does not apply to such an application; but no application may be instituted in respect of a sum after the period of 6 years beginning with the day on which it became due under Part II.

(4) A warrant shall not be issued under section 55(2) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 in any proceedings under this regulation.

(5) The court shall make the order if it is satisfied that the sum has become payable by the defendant and has not been paid.

(6) An order made pursuant to paragraph (5) shall be made in respect of an amount equal to the aggregate of -

(a) the sum payable, and

(b) a sum of an amount equal to the costs reasonably incurred by the applicant in obtaining the order.

(7) Where the sum payable is paid after a liability order has been applied for under paragraph (2) but before it is made, the court shall nonetheless (if so requested by the billing authority) make the order in respect of a sum of an amount equal to the costs reasonably incurred by the authority in making the application.'

[5] For completeness, Magistrates' Courts Rules 1981 (SI 1981/552), reg.98, entitled 'Form of summons', reads in full:

'(1) A summons requiring a person to appear before a magistrates' court may be issued in respect of more than one information or complaint.

(2) A summons must-

(a) state the name and address of the complainant or informant;

(b) contain notice of when and where the person is required to attend the court;

(c) specify each information or complaint in respect of which it is issued;

(d) identify the name and address of the court office for the court that issued it.

(3) A summons need not bear the name of the justice or other person issuing it, provided that the designated officer has recorded the name of that justice or other person.'

[6] The current version of reg.98 of the Magistrates' Courts Rules 1981/552 is version 4. Version 3 of reg.98, applied from 4.4.05 to 31.12.19, and is/was therefore applicable to all summons issued between 4.4.05 and 31.12.19. While it is hard to conceive of any summons issued before 1.1.20 still being live now (in 2025), it is instructive still to consider the wording to version 3: Version 3 of Reg 98 read:

'(1) A summons shall be signed by the justice issuing it or state his name and be authenticated by the signature of the clerk of a magistrates' court.

(2) A summons requiring a person to appear before a magistrates' court to answer to an information or complaint shall state shortly the matter of the information or complaint and shall state the time and place at which the defendant is required by the summons to appear.

(3) A single summons may be issued against a person in respect of several informations or complaints; but the summons shall state the matter of each information or complaint separately and shall have effect as several summonses, each issued in respect of one information or complaint.

(4) In this rule where a signature is required, an electronic signature incorporated into the document shall satisfy this requirement.'

[7] The current version of reg.98 of the Magistrates' Courts Rules 1981/552 is version 4. Version 3 of reg.98, which applied from 4.4.05 to 31.12.19, contained reg.98(3), which read:

'A single summons may be issued against a person in respect of several informations or complaints...'

It is right to note that reg.98(3) of version 3 continued:

'...but the summons shall state the matter of each information or complaint separately and shall have effect as several summonses, each issued in respect of one information or complaint.'

This does not appear in version 4, the current version, of reg.98. Whether it will be material that there is not a 'treating provision', stipulating that the one summons is to be treated as several summons (one in relation to each Complaint), remains to be seem.

[8] In Williams v East Northamptonshire District Council [2016] EWHC 470 (Admin), a Case Stated appeal in a council tax liability order case, Mr Alexander Nissen QC (sitting as a deputy High Court Judge) considered the submission, by the taxpayer/appellant, that a council tax summons had been rendered invalid/reliance upon it had been rendered an abuse of process, because the summons contain a claim by the Billing Authority for legal costs.

The deputy High Court judge rejected this submission. The deputy High Court judge said, at paragraphs 23 to 34 (note Williams was decided on version 3 of reg.98 (called below 'Article 98') of the Magistrates' Courts Rules 1981/552 rather than the current version 4 of reg.98):

'23. Primary legislation in respect of Council Tax is contained in paragraph 3 of Schedule 4 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 which sets out that Regulations may provide for liability orders and applicable costs. As I have said, the Regulations themselves are the Council Tax (Administrative and Enforcement) Regulations 1992.

24. Regulation 23 is in the following terms:

“If, within the period of 7 days beginning with the day on which a reminder notice is issued, the liable person fails to pay any instalments which are or will become due before the expiry of that period, the unpaid balance of the estimated amount (or, as the case may be, the chargeable amount) shall become payable by him at the expiry of a further period of 7 days beginning with the day of the failure.”

25. It is quite clear that the “amount” referred to in Regulation 23 is the amount of Council Tax which has fallen due. Costs are not mentioned in Regulation 23. It therefore follows that the “amount” referred to in Regulation 34(1) is also the Council Tax and not the costs reasonably incurred by the authority in connection with the application for the liability order. Similarly, the “sum which is outstanding” in Regulation 34(2) is limited to the Council Tax and has nothing whatever to do with the costs.

26. Consistent with the Regulations, the complaint which was drawn up in this case is as to the failure to pay Council Tax. Quite rightly, it makes no reference to the costs since the non payment of such costs cannot be a basis for a complaint. According to the schedule forming part of the complaint the sum payable is the sum in respect of Council Tax, not the costs.

27. Article 98 of the Magistrates Court Rules deals with the information which should appear on the face of a summons. It provides:

“A summons shall state shortly the matter of the information or complaint and shall state the time and place at which the defendant is required by the summons to appear”.

28. There can be no doubt that this summons complies with that rule in that it addresses the subject matter of the complaint and provides the other details required in Article 98. The question for me is whether the summons is an abuse of process or otherwise invalid because it also contains information about the level of costs claimed by the Respondent. There is certainly nothing in the Magistrates Court Rules which precludes additional information from appearing on the face of the summons. The Regulations themselves are also silent on the question of whether costs may or may not appear on the face of the summons. It is common ground that they do not expressly preclude reference to costs on the face of the summons. I have come to the clear conclusion that the summons is not an abuse of the process or otherwise invalid by reason of the fact that it includes reference to a claim for costs. The heading of the summons makes clear it seeks recovery of the Council Tax only. The complaint is therefore only as to the non payment of the Council Tax. The tax due is the Council Tax which is separately identified both on the first page and on the subsequent page. It is abundantly clear that the subject matter of the summons is therefore the recipient's liability for the Council Tax. The obvious purpose of identifying the costs is so as to inform the recipient of the amount of costs which are claimed by the Respondent (and thus asserted by it to be due) which can be paid before the date of the hearing. Since Regulation 34(5) expressly provides for the recipient to pay in advance of the hearing both the sum specified in the summons as outstanding, namely the Council Tax, and the costs reasonably incurred in connection with the application it is obviously convenient to use the summons as a means by which to inform the recipient of what is said by it to be that amount. It also serves to inform the recipient of the amount which the Respondent would seek from the Court by way of costs if the liability order was paid before the hearing but no costs were paid in respect of it: see Regulation 35(8). Regulation 35(8) is important because it addresses a situation in which a recipient does not dispute (or no longer disputes) the making of a liability order but does wish to claim that he should not be liable for an order for costs, at least in the amount claimed. The short paragraph at the foot of the first page of the summons makes clear that the proceedings will only be stopped if the amount of the costs claimed together with the Council Tax sought is paid. It follows that the recipient is made aware that proceedings will continue if only the Council Tax is paid or if only part of the costs claimed are paid. This is consistent with Regulation 35(8).

29. The Appellant disputed the Respondent's submission that recipients would want to know in advance the amount of costs that would be claimed against them. I do not agree. In my view, that is precisely the sort of information which ought to be made available.

30. I accept the Respondent's submission that the summons is not invalidated by reason of the inclusion of additional information beyond the subject matter of the complaint. There is nothing on the face of the summons which suggests that a recipient cannot challenge the amount of the Council Tax or the sum which is said to be due in respect of costs. As I have said, the final paragraph is to the contrary. There is nothing misleading in informing the recipient that £75 is said to be due in respect of costs of the application. It is also clear from the wording at the foot of the summons that this is a sum which is referable to the costs which are said to have already been incurred in connection with the application and, for that reason, those costs did not include such future costs as may be incurred if attendance at the hearing of the summons were required.

31. I reject the Appellant's submission that the claim for costs is not justiciable. No reasonable recipient of the summons could have concluded that fixed costs of £75 would have to be paid if the matter was contested. The summons did not usurp the authority of the Magistrates' Court to determine that, in a particular case, the costs reasonably incurred in obtaining the order were in a different amount. (In fact, in this case, the Respondent chose not to claim any additional costs of the hearing and confined itself to the costs of the application.)

32. I accept that the order for costs did not fall to be made until after the point in time when the basis for the liability order had itself been established but that is no reason for not telling the recipient in advance what minimum claim for costs would be pursued by the Respondent if such a liability order were subsequently to be made. In this case, as I would expect to be the case whenever it is contested, the level of costs was the subject of evidence and submissions of the parties. The Court did not accede to the claim for £75 without investigation.

33. The demand for costs was not unlawful. It was the amount which the Respondent properly contended was due to it. Contrary to the Appellant's submission, the lack of explanation as to its breakdown is not such as to make it unlawful.

34. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the Magistrates' Court was correct to find that the application for the liability order was valid when the summons included a request for costs. The fact that the summons included an amount in respect of costs did not render it an abuse of process.' [bold added]