[1] Section 45A of the LGFA 1988 is entitled 'Unoccupied hereditaments: zero-rating' and reads:

'(1) Where section 45 applies in relation to a hereditament, the chargeable amount for a chargeable day is zero in the following cases.

(2) The first case is where -

(a) the ratepayer is a charity or trustees for a charity, and

(b) it appears that when next in use the hereditament will be wholly or mainly used for charitable purposes (whether of that charity or of that and other charities).

(3) The second case is where -

(a) the ratepayer is a registered club for the purposes of Chapter 9 of Part 13 of the Corporation Tax Act 2010 (community amateur sports clubs), and

(b) it appears that when the hereditament is next in use -

(i) it will be wholly or mainly used for the purposes of that club and that club will be such a registered club, or

(ii) it will be wholly or mainly used for the purposes of two or more clubs including that club, and each of those clubs will be such a registered club.'

Separately, note: section 45(4C) of the LGFA 1988 provides relief for hereditaments wholly or mainly used for telecommunication equipment.

[2] The most striking divergence, from the English exemptions, arises from:

(a) inclusion of 'the whole of which' in reg.4(a) and 4(b);

(b) structure and £2,600 figure in reg.4(g); and

(c) reg.6 containing '26 weeks' in place of '6 weeks', as from 1.4.22. The contents of reg.6 affects the availability of the reg.4(a) and 4(b) exemptions. This change, from 1.4.22, was brought into force by Non-Domestic Rating (Unoccupied Property) (Wales) (Amendment) Regulations 2021 (SI 2021/118 (W.31).

[3a] Section 51 of the LGFA 1988 is entitled 'Exemption' and reads:

'Schedule 5 below shall have effect to determine the extent (if any) to which a hereditament is for the purposes of this Part exempt from local non-domestic rating.'

'this Part' in section 51 refers to Part III of the LGFA 1988, entitled 'Non-domestic rating'.

[3b] The full quote from Lord Hope in Gallagher (Valuation Officer) v Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints [2008] UKHL 56 [2008] 1 WLR 1852 ('Gallagher'), at paragraph 38, is:

'The legislation is now qualified by the words “to the extent that”. Their effect is to require an apportionment to be made between those parts of the building that qualify for the exemption and those which do not.'

[3c] In Church of Scientology Religious Education College Inc v Ricketts [2023] UKUT 1 (LC); [2022] W.T.L.R. 1377 ('Ricketts'), the Upper Tribunal said, at paragraph 49:

'It is no longer sufficient to show that some part of a hereditament is used for an exempt purpose in order to secure exemption for its entirety. The exemption was reframed by the 1988 Act to apply only "to the extent that" the hereditament was used for the exempt purpose. Before that it had been understood that any such use, provided it was not trivial, would be sufficient to gain exemption for the whole hereditament. For example, in Swansea City Council v Edwards [1977] RA 209 (LT), a decision of the Lands Tribunal concerning a claim for exemption under section 39(2)(b) of the General Rate Act 1967 on the basis that a church social club was a church hall or similar building, it was said that: "Nothing contained in the section suggests that the use of the premises is required to be wholly, mainly, or even substantially for the purposes of the organisation". That is no longer the case. As Lord Hope explained in Gallagher v. Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints [2008] 1 WLR 1852, at [38]:

"The legislation is now qualified by the words "to the extent that". Their effect is to require an apportionment to be made between those parts of the building that qualify for exemption and those which do not."

Lord Hope went on to describe the circumstances in which an apportionment would be appropriate, at [39]:

"The words "to the extent that" which qualify para 11(2) would require an apportionment if a definable part of the building was occupied and used for these purposes. It need not be segregated from the rest of the building by walls or partitions, but it must be capable of being identified in the rating list for exemption as a separate hereditament. So long as this can be done, the question as to the method of apportionment is pre-eminently one for the valuation officer. No facts were put before the President to show that, in the case of any of these three buildings an apportionment would be appropriate. In this situation it will be sufficient if the building, albeit not exclusively, is nevertheless primarily occupied for a use which will qualify it for exemption under para 11(2)(a)."'

This part by part, or if a building, a room by room approach, can be seen in the judgment of Ricketts, a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber)(Martin Rodger KC; Mark Higgin FRICS).

The case involved two hereditaments (1) the London Church; and (2) the Information Centre, and whether/what parts of each were exempt under Local Government Finance Act 1988, Schedule 5, paragraph 11, (i.e. the 3rd exemption of 15), for places of worship.

In paragraph 144, the Upper Tribunal summarised its conclusions 'by reference to the Church's floor plan, as follows'

'At the London Church

Ground floor - the Chapel is exempt under paragraph 11(1)(a) ; the lobby, meeting area and refectory are exempt under paragraph 11(1)(b) ; the offices and filing room are exempt under paragraph 11(2) (b) .

First floor – the hall, information hall, classrooms, film rooms and larger interview room are exempt under paragraph 11(1)(b) ; the President's office suite is exempt under paragraph 11(2)(b) .

Second floor – all of the administrative offices are exempt under paragraph 11(2)(b) ; the remainder of the floor is exempt under paragraph 11(1)(b) .

Third floor – Mr Hubbard's office is not exempt; the administrative offices are exempt under paragraph 11(2)(b) ; the remainder of the floor is exempt under paragraph 11(1)(b) .

Fourth floor - the administrative offices are exempt under paragraph 11(2)(b) ; the Purification area is exempt under paragraph 11(1)(b) ; the remainder of the floor comprising the individual auditing suite is not exempt.

Fifth floor – three small administrative offices are exempt under paragraph 11(2)(b) ; the Academy occupying the remainder of the floor is not exempt.

At the Information Centre

The self-contained offices and storage spaces at either end of the basement are exempt under paragraph 11(2)(b) ; the remainder of the building is not exempt.'

As will be apparent, certain parts of a single hereditament were exempt, others were not. With the exempt parts not being subject to business rates, the overall business rates due for each hereditament, was less than it would otherwise have been (had all of the hereditament not been exempt)(paragraph 146).

[4a] In Tunnel Tech Ltd v Reeves (Valuation Officer) [2015] EWCA Civ 718; [2015] PTSR 1490 ('Tunnel'), Etherton C said, at paragraph 71:

'There is no obvious explanation as to why Parliament intended that the LGFA 1988 and indeed its predecessor legislation since 1928 should confer exemption for rates on market gardens where all the agricultural activities are carried on in buildings but not confer such exemption on nurseries where all the agricultural operations are carried on in buildings.'

[4b] In Cartwright v Cherry Valley Farms Ltd [2003] RA 21, the Lands Tribunal (George Barlett QC) said, under the subheading 'Used in connection with', at paragraphs 13 to 15:

13. The leading case on the meaning of the words “used in connection with” where they appear in relation to the exemption of agricultural buildings is W & J B Eastwood Ltd v Herrod (VO) [1971] AC 160. That was a case that was decided on the definition of “agricultural buildings” in section 2(2) of the Rating and Valuation (Apportionment) Act 1928. It concerned the rateability of chicken broiler houses and other buildings used for the purposes of the production of chickens and their preparation for the market. So far as material to that case, agricultural buildings were defined as “buildings … occupied together with agricultural land … and … used solely in connection with agricultural operations … thereon.” The provision thus differed from those that require consideration in the present case, but the words “in connection with” and the requirement that the use should be the sole use appear in the later provisions. It was on these that the decision in Eastwood v Herrod turned, and the words can be taken to bear the same meaning in the later provisions. The House of Lords held that the buildings were not used solely in connection with agricultural operations on agricultural land. Lord Reid said (at 168–169):

“The key words are ‘used in connection with’ agricultural operationson the land. Ordinary usage of the English language suggests that the buildings must be subsidiary or ancillary to the agricultural operations …

It is true that attaching to the definition the meaning which I prefer will lead to there being many borderline cases. Rigid dividing lines may often be preferred to making the test one of degree. But on the other hand, as the history of the interpretation of this definition by the courts shows, an unreasonable dividing line leads to even greater difficulty. I do not foresee serious difficulty if ‘used in connection with’ is held to mean use consequential on or ancillary to the agricultural operations on the land which is occupied together with the buildings …

It was argued for the respondent that the words ‘used in connection with’ agricultural operations should be strictly and narrowly construed so as to exclude buildings used to deal with the products of these operations. I observe that in the reported argument before the Lands Tribunal in Thompson v Milk Marketing Board (1952) 45 R. & I.T. 184 it was submitted with regard to a dairy farm that what happened to the milk after it had been ‘husbanded’ was in no sense an agricultural operation. One might pour it down the drain or use it in this way or that, but that had nothing to do with the agricultural operations on the land. The ultimate decision of the Court of Appeal in that case is not surprising if that was the kind of far-fetched argument submitted by the valuation officer. The whole object of producing a crop on the agricultural land is to market it in one form or another, and I think that anything done in the farm buildings, including storage and treatment must be held to be done in connection with the agricultural operations on the land.

But here again there must be a limit. Everything is saleable at a price, so even storage for a time or very simple treatment is not strictly necessary. One must have regard to ordinary and reasonable practice. But there comes a stage when further operations cannot reasonably be said to be consequential on the agricultural operations of producing the crop. I agree with Lord Hunter when he said in Midlothian Assessor v Buccleuch Estates Ltd 1962 S.C. 453 , 459:

‘I would agree that agricultural and pasturage do not cease when the crops are grown on (sic) beasts raised, but may properly include operations reasonably necessary to make the product marketable or disposable to profit.’

But I also agree with Lord Sorn when he said in Perty and Kinross Assessor v Scottish Milk Marketing Board, 1963 S.C. 95 that if a farmer set up a butcher's shop on his farm to sell his fat stock as meat no one would suggest that it should be derated, for the shop would be used for an independent purpose distinct from the farming operations.”

14. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest said (at 174 G–H):

“…The words of the definition of ‘agricultural buildings' suggest to my mind buildings that are needed as an adjunct or a necessary aid to agricultural operations taking place on agricultural land and used solely in connection with those operations. This does not necessarily involve that the use to which the buildings are put must be of minor or minimal importance but it does involve that no part of the use is unconnected with the agricultural land that is needed as an adjunct or aid to the operations and enterprises for which the layer houses are used.”

15. Viscount Dilhorne said (at 181B):

“Were the appellants' buildings ‘used solely in connection with’ these operations? In my opinion, the answer is, No. I think that the language of the definition requires that buildings to come within it must be used as adjuncts to the agricultural operations on the land, or as Donovan L.J. said in Gilmore v Baker-Carr [1962] 1 W.L.R. 1165 , 1175 ‘ancillary or complementary to the agricultural purpose of the land, and not vice versa.’”'

[5a] In Gallagher (Valuation Officer) v Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints [2008] UKHL 56 [2008] 1 WLR 1852,

(1) Lord Hoffman said, at paragraph 3:

'The valuation officer accepted that the stake centre, with its chapel, associated hall and ancillary rooms, was a “place of public religious worship” which was entitled to exemption under paragraph 1(a) or (b).'

(2) Lord Hope said, at paragraph 24:

'The stake centre is in part a chapel and in part a chapel hall. As a chapel it is “a place of public religious worship” within the meaning of paragraph 11(1)(a) of Schedule 5 . As a chapel hall it is exempt under paragraph 11(1)(b) because it is “used in connection with” the chapel for the purposes of the organisation responsible for the conduct of public worship there.'

[5b] In Gallagher (Valuation Officer) v Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints [2008] UKHL 56 [2008] 1 WLR 1852,  there was no question that members of the public were excluded from the temple (and so excluded from any religious service held there). Even Mormons were excluded, unless they had good standing and had a 'recommend'. But Lord Hope addressed the issue of how to discern whether or not the public were excluded, at paragraphs 28-30:

'It is worth noting that the church is not the only Christian body whose religious practices might have prompted a change in the legislation, had this been thought to be appropriate, because they fell outside the scope of the exemption as interpreted in Henning's case. In Broxtowe Borough Council v Birch [1983] 1 WLR 314 the question was whether two buildings used for religious worship by a company of Christians known as the Exclusive Brethren were entitled to the exemption. When one of them was first used for this purpose in 1967 a notice board was placed outside it which stated that the word of God would be preached there at certain times on a Sunday. This was taken to be a declaration that the building was open to the public for religious worship according to the Henning test, so it was shown as exempt in the valuation list. The second building came into use in 1971, and it too was shown as exempt. But by that time the Brethren who occupied the buildings had decided to follow the teaching of James Taylor junior, principally in his teaching about separation from evil. Consequently no notice board was placed outside the second building, and the notice board outside the first building was taken down. In the result there was no sign that the public had permission to enter either of them and attend religious worship there. A proposal by the rating authority to alter the valuation list by entering the buildings as rateable was dismissed by the local valuation court, but it was upheld on appeal. The Court of Appeal was told that there might be 300 other halls, where brethren of the same persuasion met, that would lose the benefit of the statutory exemption as a result of that decision.

Slade LJ said in the Broxtowe Borough Council case, at p 334, that in his judgment a meeting of persons which takes place on private premises cannot be said to be “public” within the ordinary meaning of words unless members of the public, or of the particular section of the public most concerned, are given some notice that they will not be treated as trespassers or intruders if they seek to enter the premises and attend the meeting. The forms of notice, he said, could be many and various. In some cases even the exterior appearance of the building might be enough to indicate to members of the public that they will be welcome.

In the present case however the valuation officer does not need to rely on the absence of a notice or on the appearance of the temple from outside. To some it may seem like a large church or a cathedral. But there is no invitation to the public, or any section of it, to enter the temple and worship there. On the contrary, the public, and even that section of the public most concerned because they are members of the Mormon church, are actively excluded from it. There simply is no question of members of the public in general being admitted to the temple to participate in religious worship there. And only those Mormons whose worthiness to do so has been established after a searching private interview with the local bishop or branch president and stake president may receive a pass to enter it. The worship that takes place in the temple on those conditions cannot, in the application of the Henning test, be said to be public religious worship.'

[5c] In Gallagher (Valuation Officer) v Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints [2008] UKHL 56 [2008] 1 WLR 1852 ('Gallagher'), Lord Hope said, at paragraph 26:

'I am not persuaded that your Lordships would be justified in departing from the meaning that this House gave to the words “a place of public religious worship” in Henning v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints [1964] AC 420 . In London Corporation v Cusack-Smith [1955] AC 337 , 361 Lord Reid said that where Parliament has continued to use words of which the meaning has been settled by decisions of the court, it is to be presumed that it intends the words to continue to have that meaning. This is a presumption, not a rule. But the history of the legislation since the date of the judgment indicates that Parliament has been content that the words “a place of public religious worship” should continue to receive the interpretation that the House gave to them in Henning's case [1964] AC 420.'

[5d] In Gallagher (Valuation Officer) v Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints [2008] UKHL 56 [2008] 1 WLR 1852 ('Gallagher'), Lord Hoffman said, at paragraph 12:

'The rule that exemption is accorded to places of worship only if they are open to the public is perfectly general. Anyone may comply.'

[6] In Gallagher (Valuation Officer) v Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints [2008] UKHL 56 [2008] 1 WLR 1852 ('Gallagher'), it was submitted that:

'...the discrimination is indirect. It is true that anyone may comply, but the reason why the Mormons cannot comply is that their religion prevents them from doing so. It was therefore discrimination not to treat them differently. The European Court of Human Rights has decided that article 14 applies to indirect discrimination resulting from a failure to accord different treatment to cases which ought to be treated differently: see Thlimmenos v Greece (2000) 31 EHRR 411 and DH v Czech Republic (Application No 57325/00) (unreported) given 13 November 2007, para 175.' (paragraph 12)

Lord Hoffman said in Gallagher, at paragraphs 13 and 14:

'In order to constitute discrimination on grounds of religion, however, the alleged discrimination must fall “within the ambit” of a right protected by article 9, in this case, the right to manifest one's religion. In the present case, the liability of the temple to a non-domestic rate (reduced by 80% on account of the charitable nature of its use) would not prevent the Mormons from manifesting their religion. But I would not regard that as conclusive. If the legislation imposed rates only upon Mormons, I would regard that as being within the ambit of article 9 even if the Mormons could easily afford to pay them. But the present case is not one in which the Mormons are taxed on account of their religion. It is only that their religion prevents them from providing the public benefit necessary to secure a tax advantage. That seems to me an altogether different matter.

For example, I do not think that a Sabbatarian could complain that he was discriminated against because he was unable, on religious grounds, to provide services on the Sabbath and therefore earned less than people of a different religion. A case which in my opinion is very much in point is M v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] 2 AC 91, in which a woman would have been able to secure a reduction in her liability for the maintenance of her child if she had been living with a male partner. She was unable to qualify because, on account of her sexual orientation, she chose to live with a female partner. The House of Lords decided that the alleged act of discrimination did not fall within the ambit of article 8 (her right to family life and in particular her right to live with a female partner) because loss of the opportunity to gain a financial advantage was too remote from interference with the right in question. The same seems to me true of this case.'

Lord Hope said, at paragraph 31:

'In my opinion Parliament's decision as to the scope of the exemption was within the discretionary area of judgment afforded to it by that paragraph. As there is no sound basis for holding that the Henning test should be departed from, the church's argument that the temple is exempt under paragraph 11(1)(a) must fail.'

[7] In Gallagher (Valuation Officer) v Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints [2008] UKHL 56 [2008] 1 WLR 1852 ('Gallagher'), Lord Hoffman said, at paragraph 15:

'Parliament must have a wide discretion in deciding what should be regarded as a sufficient public benefit to justify exemption from taxation and in my opinion it was entitled to take the view that public access to religious services was such a benefit.'

In Gallagher, Lord Scott considered that there may be indirect discrimination from the withholding of Business Rates relief, from a hereditament because, while it was a place of a place of religious worship, it is not a place of public religious worship. Lord Scott said, at paragraph 50:

'If that is so, there is, as it seems to me, an element of discrimination that requires to be justified. The discrimination consists of the denial of rating relief for the temple on the ground that, although a place of religious worship, it is not a place of public religious worship. No one who is not a Mormon, or who, although a Mormon, does not possess a “recommend” permitting him or her entry, can enter the temple (see para 5 of Lord Hoffmann's opinion). The “open doors” requirement in order to enable premises used for religious worship to qualify for rating relief discriminates, adversely to the Mormons, between premises used for religious worship that are open to the public and those that are not. If that is right, the discrimination requires to be justified if it is to escape being held unlawful.'

Such discrimination required justifying, if it was not to be unlawful. As to justification, Lord Scott said, at paragraph 51:

'I would, for my part, unhesitatingly hold that the grant of rating relief to premises for religious services that are open to the public and the withholding of that relief from premises for religious services which take place behind closed doors through which only a select few may pass is well justifiable and within the margin of appreciation available to individual signatory states. First, states may justifiably take the view that the practice of religion is beneficial both to the individuals who practise it as well as to the community of whom the individuals form part, and that, therefore, relief from rating for premises where religious worship takes place is in the public interest. But, second, states may also recognise that, although religion may be beneficial both to individuals and to the community, it is capable also of being divisive and, sometimes, of becoming dangerously so. No one who lives in a country such as ours, with a community of diverse ethnic and racial origins and of diverse cultures and religions, can be unaware of this. Religion can bind communities together; but it can also emphasise their differences. In these circumstances secrecy in religious practices provides the soil in which suspicions and unfounded prejudices can take root and grow; openness in religious practices, on the other hand, can dispel suspicions and contradict prejudices. I can see every reason why a state should adopt a general policy under which fiscal relief for premises used for religious worship is available where the premises are open to the general public and is withheld where they are not.'

[8] In Gallagher (Valuation Officer) v Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints [2008] UKHL 56 [2008] 1 WLR 1852 ('Gallagher'), Lord Hoffman said, at paragraph 16:

'The church's alternative argument is that the temple comes within sub-paragraph (b) as “a church hall, chapel hall or similar building used in connection with” a place of public worship. The argument is that the temple is used in connection with the stake centre, which admits the public and is accepted to be a place of public worship. But in my opinion the words “used in connection with” carry, in this context, an implication of ancillary use, which is reinforced by the requirement that the building should be similar to a church hall or chapel hall. To apply this to the temple would be having the tail wag the dog. The use of the temple is not ancillary to the use of the stake centre but a separate and independent use. This point was argued in the Court of Appeal in Henning's case [1962] 1 WLR 1091 but summarily dismissed. Lord Denning MR said, at p 1099:

“The short answer is that this temple is not a church hall, chapel hall, nor a similar building. It is not in the least on the same footing as a church hall or chapel hall. It is a very sacred sanctuary, quite different from a building of that category.”'

Lord Hope, at paragraph 33, declined to decide '...whether the temple can properly be described as a church hall, a chapel hall or other similar building.', favouring deciding the case on the 'used in connection with' phrase (paragraph 33)

[9] In Gallagher (Valuation Officer) v Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints [2008] UKHL 56 [2008] 1 WLR 1852 ('Gallagher'), Lord Hoffman referred to the Court of Appeal in Henning [1962] 1 WLR 1091 and said, at paragraphs 16-17:

'Donovan LJ said, at p 1100, that the temple was “far too important in the life of the Mormon church” to be described as a building similar to a church hall or chapel hall. I agree.'

Lord Hope in Gallagher said, at paragraph 33:

'The key words, which colour the meaning of the entire paragraph, are the words “used in connection with”. These too are words whose meaning has long been settled by decisions of the court in the context of exemption from non-domestic rating. The phrase appears in several places in paragraphs 1 to 8 of Schedule 5 to the 1988 Act which deal with agricultural premises, and they appear also in paragraph 9 which deals with fish farms. The wording of these paragraphs repeats what was to be found in the legislation which the 1988 Act replaced. In my opinion the meaning that has been given by the court to these words is sufficient to show that the temple—even if it could be described as a church hall, a chapel hall or other similar building, taking those words on their own—does not fall within the exemption that is provided for by this paragraph.

Lord Hope continued, at paragraphs 34 to 35:

'In W & J B Eastwood Ltd v Herrod [1971] AC 160 the question was whether buildings used for producing broiler chickens were agricultural buildings within the meaning of section 2(2) of the Rating and Valuation (Apportionment) Act 1928. They would have been exempt had it been possible to say that they were used “solely” in connection with the agricultural operations on the land together with which they were occupied, which was used for the production of barley which was converted into poultry food. Lord Reid said, at p 168, that the key words were “used in connection with”. He added that the ordinary usage of the English language suggested that the buildings must be subsidiary or ancillary to the agricultural operations, and that he did not foresee serious difficulty if the phrase was held to mean use consequential on or ancillary to the agricultural operations on the land which was occupied together with the buildings. At p 169, he said that the use of the buildings were in no sense ancillary to the agricultural operations on the land, as it was a large commercial enterprise in which the use of the land played a very minor part. Similar expressions of opinion are to be found in the speeches of Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Guest and Viscount Dilhorne.

The application of Lord Reid's explanation of the meaning of the phrase to the facts admits of only one answer in this case. As the Court of Appeal held in the Henning case [1964] AC 420, the sacredness of the building and of the functions that are performed there are decisive on this point. [The President of the Lands Tribunal] having considered the facts, said that for members of the church the temple is the house of the Lord, the most sacred place on earth. The ceremonies that take place there are regarded by members of the church as of profound theological importance. Its exclusivity, with access being accorded only to those with a recommend, is a reflection of its sacred nature and of the purpose for which access is required. I think that on those findings it would be a complete inversion of the facts to describe the temple as ancillary or subsidiary to the stake centre.

[10] In Gallagher (Valuation Officer) v Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints [2008] UKHL 56 [2008] 1 WLR 1852 ('Gallagher'), Lord Hoffman considered whether the other buildings on the site, fell within paragraph 11(2) of Schedule 5. He said, at paragraph 10:

'the administrative buildings must be used for purposes relating to the organisation of worship in such a place and the offices must be used by an organisation responsible for public worship in such a place.'

And, after stating he agreed with Lord Hope as to the other buildings on the site, he said, at paragraphs 18-21:

'First, the missionary training centre, which is alleged by the church to be exempt under paragraph (2)(a). As its name suggests, it is used for training missionaries. The training lasts 19 days and is intended, as the Lands Tribunal found, to instruct Mormon priests how best to present the message of the church to the public. It may include some instruction in how to conduct services, although both the Lands Tribunal and the Court of Appeal found that this was not the primary purpose of the training. But the real difficulty for the church is that there is nothing to connect the training with the stake centre, which is the only relevant place of public worship. Paragraph (2)(a) requires that the hereditament must be occupied by the organisation responsible for the conduct of public religious worship in a place falling within paragraph (1)(a), ie the stake centre and must be used for “carrying out administrative or other activities relating to the organisation of the conduct of public religious worship in such a place ” (emphasis added). Even if (which I doubt) training priests to conduct services can be described as activities relating to the organisation of the conduct of public religious worship, it cannot possibly be said to relate to the conduct of such worship in the stake centre.

The patrons' services building, as mentioned earlier, welcomes visitors to the site, sells church literature in printed or electronic form, and has provision for genealogical research. The church claims that it falls within paragraphs (1)(b) or (2)(a). However, it seems to me to come within neither, for much the same reasons as I have given in connection with the missionary training centre. It is in fact shut on Sundays, the day on which public worship at the stake centre takes place. The reception area serves visitors to the site in general but particularly those who come to the temple. However, the building is not in the least like a church hall or chapel hall (paragraph (1)(b)) and none of the activities which take place there relate to the “organisation of the conduct of public religious worship” in the stake centre (paragraph (2)(a)).

The grounds building, used for lawnmowers, maintenance equipment and the like, is also not concerned with the organisation of the conduct of public religious worship in the stake centre. Nor is the patrons' accommodation, which provides accommodation for patrons visiting the temple.'

Lord Hope in Gallagher said, at paragraph 36 'It is not suggested that any of the other buildings on the hereditament are entitled to exemption under paragraph 11(1)(a).' before going on to consider the other buildings, in detail, from paragraphs 37 to 42:

'The only other building that was said to be entitled to exemption under paragraph 11(1)(b) was the patrons' services building. It has three distinct areas. One is the foyer and day lounge. It is a reception area for visitors to the entire complex, although it has a particular role for those who are to visit the temple. The second was described by [The President of the Lands Tribunal] as a shop. It sells religious books and leaflets, cds and tapes relating to doctrinal beliefs and temple clothing. The third area is the family history area, where forebears are identified for the baptism in the temple of patrons as proxies on their behalf. [Counsel of the church] said that the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the building was not entitled to exemption under paragraph 11(1)(b) was based on some very fine distinctions, bearing in mind that the way that Wesley House was treated in Trustees of West London Methodist Mission v Holborn Borough Council (1958) 3 RRC 86 showed that it would have been non-rateable if it had been situated within the stake centre.

Uses that are ancillary to what goes on in the temple are plainly of no assistance to the church, as the temple is not a place falling within paragraph 11(1)(a). As for the rest, I agree with Neuberger LJ in the Court of Appeal [2007] RA 1, para 41, that the building as a whole falls outside paragraph 11(1)(b) as it does not have the characteristics of a church hall, chapel hall or similar building. I would reject [counsel for the church's] analogy with the West London Methodist Mission case. It is no longer a reliable guide as to how buildings that contain distinct areas that are put to a variety of uses should be treated. The legislation is now qualified by the words “to the extent that”. Their effect is to require an apportionment to be made between those parts of the building that qualify for the exemption and those which do not.

The patrons' services building was also said to be entitled to exemption under paragraph 11(2), as were the missionary training centre, the patrons' accommodation and the grounds building. The question whether they are entitled to exemption under this paragraph requires one or other of two tests to be satisfied. First, paragraph 11(2)(a) requires them to be occupied for the carrying out of administrative or other activities by an organisation responsible for the conduct of public religious worship in a place falling within paragraph 11(1)(a). Second, paragraph 11(2)(b) requires them to be used as an office or for office purposes, or for purposes ancillary to its use as an office or for office purposes. It is not suggested that any of these buildings qualify for exemption under paragraph 11(2)(b). The words “to the extent that” which qualify paragraph 11(2) would require an apportionment if a definable part of the building was occupied and used for these purposes. It need not be segregated from the rest of the building by walls or partitions, but it must be capable of being identified in the rating list for exemption as a separate hereditament. So long as this can be done, the question as to the method of apportionment is pre-eminently one for the valuation officer. No facts were put before Mr Bartlett to show that, in the case of any of these three buildings an apportionment would be appropriate. In this situation it will be sufficient if the building, albeit not exclusively, is nevertheless primarily occupied for a use which will qualify it for exemption under paragraph 11(2)(a).

The problem for the church does not lie in satisfying the opening words of paragraph 11(2). It plainly is an organisation responsible for the conduct of public religious worship in the stake centre. But it needs to satisfy sub-paragraph (2)(a) if it is to obtain the exemption. The mere fact that there are links between what happens in these buildings and what happens in the stake centre, as [counsel for the church] suggested, will not suffice. To be within this sub-paragraph, the use must be for administrative or other activities relating to “the organisation of the conduct” of public religious worship there. This cannot be said to be so in the case of the missionary training centre. As [The President of the Lands Tribunal] put it, the missionaries are instructed as part of their training in the conduct of chapel services. But this is not the primary purpose of their training. In any event this is an activity which relates to how services in general are conducted, not to the organisation of the conduct of services in the stake centre or any other building that the church uses for public religious worship. Nor can it can be said of the use that is made of the patrons' accommodation. It merely provides short-term living accommodation that is primarily used by members of the church visiting the temple.

The grounds building houses machinery and equipment which is used for the maintenance of the grounds and all the buildings on the site. There is also a workshop area, a garage and a plant room which includes the air-conditioning plant for the temple. It serves the whole of the site including the stake centre. But it is not suggested that a definable part of it is used for serving the stake centre, nor is serving the stake centre the primary purpose for which it is used. In any event, as [The President of the Lands Tribunal] said, it is not used for activities that relate to the organisation of the conduct of public religious worship there. I agree with [counsel for the church] that this conclusion turns on fine distinctions, because areas used for the same purposes which were within the stake centre and not sufficiently clearly identifiable for apportionment would qualify for exemption along with the rest of the building of which they formed part. But the valuation officer must take each building on the hereditament as he finds it, according to the way it is actually occupied and used by the ratepayer.

In my opinion the facts of this case show that none of the buildings other than the stake centre satisfy the requirements of paragraph 11 of Schedule 5 to the 1988 Act.'

[11] In Church of Scientology Religious Education College Inc v Ricketts [2023] UKUT 1 (LC); [2022] W.T.L.R. 1377 ('Ricketts'), the Upper Tribunal said, under the subheading 'Public religious worship', at paragraphs 50 to 60:

'50. The fact that church premises may be registered under the Places of Worship Registration Act 1855 simply by being places of religious worship, yet to be exempt from rating, a building must additionally be a place of public religious worship has given rise to three significant cases to which we were referred. Two of these concerned the Mormon Church while the third concerned the Exclusive Brethren.

51. The decision of the House of Lords in Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Henning [1964] AC 420 concerned the Mormon Temple at Godstone (one of only two Mormon Temples in Europe). Unlike the much more numerous Mormon chapels, which were open to all members of the Church and to the public generally (and which were admittedly exempt from rating) the Temple was a special building which was accessible only to a restricted class of Mormons of good standing. About 5,000 people a year entered the Temple, which was certified as a place of religious worship. The Lands Tribunal held that the Temple satisfied the requirement that it be a place of public religious worship and allowed the Church's claim for exemption, but the Court of Appeal reversed its decision.

52. The Church argued that "public worship" meant congregational worship as distinct from private or family devotion conducted in one's own home, but the House of Lords upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal and dismissed the claim for exemption. The leading speech was given by Lord Pearce who acknowledged that the Church's interpretation was a possible one, but rejected it, saying this, at 440:

"By the Act of 1833 the legislature was intending to extend the privileges of exemption enjoyed by the Anglican churches to similar places of worship belonging to other denominations. Since the Church of England worshipped with open doors and its worship was in that sense public, it is unlikely that the legislature intended by the word "public" some more subjective meaning which would embrace in the phrase "public religious worship" any congregational worship observed behind doors closed to the public.

I find it impossible, therefore, to hold that the words 'places of public religious worship' includes places which, though from the worshippers' point of view they were public as opposed to domestic, yet in the more ordinary sense were not public since the public was excluded."

53. The majority agreed. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest said, at 435:

"In my view the conception of public religious worship involves the coming together for corporate worship of a congregation or meeting or assembly of people, but I think that it further involves that the worship is in a place which is open to all properly disposed persons who wish to be present"

54. Broxtowe v. Birch [1983] 1 WLR 314 concerned the eligibility for exemption of two meeting halls occupied by the Exclusive Brethren, a Christian fellowship who worshiped privately behind closed doors. There was nothing about their meeting places to indicate that they were places of worship, but meetings were regularly attended by stable congregations of 250 or 300 people. Inquirers were told the place and time of meetings, and people outside the fellowship could attend. The issue once again was whether the halls were places of public religious worship.

55. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Lands Tribunal that the meeting halls were not exempt. Stephenson LJ described a spectrum running from the religious worship practised in the parish churches of the Church of England and in Roman Catholic and non-conformist churches at one end, to the private devotions of individuals in their homes at the other, and considered that the meeting halls of the Exclusive Brethren lay "near the borderline which divides the private from the public". While accepting that meetings were theoretically open to all "properly disposed persons" (as Lord Morris had put it in Henning ) he identified what was missing, at 326D:

"A building on private property must somehow declare itself open to the public if activities which are carried on inside it are to be public, and the nature of those activities must be brought to the notice of the outside world if they are not to be private activities. As it was variously put from the Bench, the worship must be made public; the doors of the place of worship must be open not merely subjectively in the minds and hearts of the worshipping community but objectively in some manifestation of their intention that it should be open."

He went on to describe how worship was to be made public and explained that satisfaction of the requirement did not depend on a church's success in attracting non-members to attend, at 326E:

"Such signs may be given by the building itself. That the doors are really open to the public in fact and not only in theory may be indicated by numbers of people entering the building or of motor cars and cycles parking outside it. Many, if not most, churches and chapels indicate their nature and the nature of what goes on inside them by their style of architecture or religious symbols or the ringing of a bell, as well as by notices of services on a notice board, or in leaflets or newspapers, or by speakers preaching and appealing to the public in the open air or by house to house calls. There may be places of religious worship which without any of these attractions are in fact used for worship by members of the public at large. If there are such, they would qualify by the fact that their services were "performed in public". On the other hand there may be places of religious worship advertised as such by some or all of the means I have enumerated, where nevertheless no member of the general public ever attends the services or meetings. Such a church or meeting hall also would qualify by being open to the public".

56. At 326H Stephenson LJ described this as the "invitation" test.

57. Oliver LJ agreed, although neither he nor Slade LJ seem to have found the case as evenly balanced as Stephenson LJ had suggested. He distinguished between the willingness of the Brethren to welcome newcomers in principle, and their avoidance of anything which might be likely to attract the interest of others:

"… their method of conducting their affairs does, as it seems to me, have the practical effect that their meetings are in fact private and secret in the sense that there is no readily discernible way in which anyone not already a member of the Brethren would be likely to find out about them."

He also referred to the "invitation" test at 331D, describing it as a "jury question" and "a question of fact and degree in each case and none the worse for that."

58. The most recent of the cases to which we were referred was Gallagher v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints [2008] 1 WLR 1852, in which the Mormon Church attempted unsuccessfully to reverse the effect of Henning on the grounds that it offended the Church's rights under articles 9 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, scheduled to the Human Rights Act 1998. For our purposes the main interest in the appeal lies in what the House of Lords said about the exemption in favour of church halls and similar buildings in paragraph 11(1)(b), but we were also asked by [counsel for the Valuation Officer] to note that Lord Scott of Foscotte, at [51], considered that the justification for withholding the exemption where services take place behind closed doors, lay in the capacity of religion sometimes to be dangerously divisive:

"… secrecy in religious practices provides the soil in which suspicions and unfounded prejudices can take root and grow; openness in religious practices, on the other hand, can dispel suspicions and contradict prejudices."

59. In summary, two complementary strands can be identified in the relevant cases. A place of religious worship will be a public place, entitled to exemption, if all "properly disposed persons" are eligible to enter and participate in the acts of worship being conducted there. But that test will not be satisfied simply by a theoretical disposition to welcome outsiders, and requires consideration of what the building itself, or the organisation, do at a practical level to invite those from outside the worshipping community to join in their worship. Beyond that, the question whether a building is a place of public religious worship is a question of fact.' [emphasis in original is in italics; here it is bold]

[12] In Places of Worship Registration Act 1855, section 2 is entitled 'Places of worship to be certified to Registrar General.' and reads:

'Every place of meeting for religious worship of Protestant Dissenters or other Protestants, and of persons professing the Roman Catholic religion, [...] 1 not heretofore certified and registered or recorded in manner required by law, and every place of meeting for religious worship of persons professing the Jewish religion, not heretofore certified and registered or recorded as aforesaid, and every place of meeting for religious worship of any other body or denomination of persons, may be certified in writing to the Registrar General of Births, Deaths, and Marriages in England, through the superintendent registrar of births, deaths, and marriages of the district in which such place may be situate; and such certificate shall be in duplicate, and upon forms in accordance with Schedule A. to this Act, or to the like effect, such forms to be provided by the said Registrar General, and to be obtained (without payment) upon application to such superintendent registrar as aforesaid; and the said superintendent registrar shall, upon the receipt of such certificate in duplicate, forthwith transmit the same to the said Registrar General, who, after having caused the place of meeting therein mentioned to be recorded as herein-after directed, shall return one of the said certificates to the said superintendent registrar, to be re-delivered by him to the certifying party, and shall keep the other certificate with the records of the General Register Office.'