[7] In R. (on the application of Salmon) v Feltham Magistrates' Court [2008] EWHC 3507 (Admin) ('Salmon'), Mr Salmon, the taxpayer contended before the Magistrates Court, on the billing authority's complaint for a council tax liability order, that he did not owe council tax on a property. On the deployability of this defence, in the Magistrates' Court, Stadlen J said, at paragraphs 42 and 43:

42. ...the decision by the local authority that [the taxpayer] was liable to pay council tax in respect of the [the property], and the decision that that was because it was a house in multiple occupation, was a decision which he had a right under section 16 to appeal against to a valuation tribunal if aggrieved. Indeed, he was notified of the existence of that right in this very case but told me that he did not avail himself of that right in respect of this period, that is to say 2007/2008, prior to the summons or the date of the hearing in front of the Magistrates. If it were indeed the case that it was not for the purposes of 2007/2008 a house in multiple occupation for the purposes of the Act, then he would have had a right to appeal to a valuation tribunal on that ground and on that ground, had it been accepted by the Tribunal, the decision of the defendant that he is liable to pay council tax for 2007/2008 would have been overturned.

43. In those circumstances, I do not have the slightest doubt that that is a matter which could be the subject of an appeal under section 16 and therefore that by virtue of paragraph 57 of the Regulations it is a matter that could not be raised in the proceedings in front of the Magistrates' Court for non-payment of the sums contained in the demand and the arrears notice.

On this as a ground for judicially reviewing the Magistrates' Court decision, Stadlen J in Salmon, he said, at paragraph 43:

'In those circumstances, it seems to me that this ground of appeal is hopelessly misconceived.'

Later, at paragraph 47, Stadlen J in Salmon, after mentioning the Magistrates, said:

'...the question of multiple occupancy was not a matter relevant to what they had to determine because of the section 57 provision. S

[8] The full quote from William Davis J in Wiltshire Council v Piggin [2016] PTSR 845, at paragraph 20, is:

'In the hearing in the magistrates' court, the defendant argued that he was not liable for the outstanding council tax because the property was owned by a trust. Thus, the argument is his argument before the lower court fell clearly within the scope of section 16(1). Therefore, by virtue of regulation 57 this was a matter that could have been determined by way of an appeal to the valuation tribunal and was not in those circumstances a matter that could be raised by way of defence in proceedings in the magistrates' court.'

[9a] In Yang v. The Official Receiver. Manchester City Council [2013] EWHC 3577 (Ch), HHJ Hodge QC said, at paragraphs 21 and 22:

'Regulation 34 of the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992 provides that if an amount which has fallen due by way of council tax is wholly or partly unpaid, the billing authority may apply to a magistrates court for an order against the person by whom it is payable. By regulation 34(6), the court shall make the order if it is satisfied that the sum has become payable by the defendant and has not been paid.

By regulation 57(1) any matter which can be the subject of an appeal under Section 16 of the primary legislation (the Local Government Finance Act 1992) may not be raised in proceedings in the magistrates court for a liability order. Section 16 of the 1992 Act provides that a person may appeal to a valuation tribunal if he is aggrieved by (a) any decision of a billing authority that a dwelling is a chargeable dwelling or that he is liable to pay council tax in respect of such a dwelling; or (b) any calculation made by such an authority of an amount which he is liable to pay to the authority in respect of council tax. I therefore accept Mr Clark's submission that on an application for a liability order by the billing authority, the magistrates cannot look into the questions (1) whether the property is chargeable; or (2) whether the respondent to the summons is liable to pay the council tax; or (3) whether the calculation of the alleged liability is correct. But I would not accept Mr Clark's further submission that that means that a liability order is the equivalent of a default judgment. The primary and secondary legislation governing the liability for, and assessment to, council tax provides for challenges to a decision of a billing authority to be made through the valuation tribunal appeal mechanism. The making of a liability order by the magistrate's court has the effect of converting that liability into a judgment; but it does not mean that it is the equivalent of a default judgment. By regulation 49(1) it is expressly provided that where a liability order has been made, and the debtor against whom it is made is an individual, the amount due shall be deemed to be a debt for the purposes of Section 267 of the Insolvency Act, grounding a creditor's petition.'

In Okon v London Borough Of Lewisham [2016] EWHC 864 (Ch) (18 April 2016), Mr Robin Hollington QC (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the Chancery Division), quoted the above passages (along with others), at paragraph 21, before stating, at paragraph 22:

'I entirely agree with the above summary, and it is in my view entirely consistent with the subsequent Piggin case.'

After Okon was decided in 2016, Yang v. The Official Receiver came before the Court of Appeal, in Yang v Official Receiver [2017] EWCA Civ 1465; [2018] 2 WLR 307, wherein the decision of HHJ Hodge QC at first instance, was affirmed.

[10] In Yang v Official Receiver [2017] EWCA Civ 1465 [2018] 2 W.L.R. 307, Gloster LJ noted what happened in Yang, when the Valuation Tribunal determined in the defendant/taxpayer's favour on a Three Section 16(1) Defence (in Yang, it was whether or not the property was a HMO, and so, whether or not consequently liability was placed on the defendant). At paragraph 13, Gloster LJ said:

'...on 6 August 2012 the Valuation Tribunal found that the local authority should never have designated the applicant's rental property as a house in multiple occupation. Thus it was ordered that the local authority should remove the applicant from liability from 16 March 2006 to 16 May 2007. Since the applicant had by this time paid the liability orders, the local authority gave her credit for that sum.'

[11a] To appeal, the taxpayer will need to comply with regulation 20A of the Valuation Tribunal for England (Council Tax and Rating Appeals) (Procedure) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/2269), entitled 'Notices of appeal - section 16 appeals'. That reads:

'(1) A section 16 appeal shall be initiated by giving written notice of appeal to the VTE.

(2) A notice of appeal in the case of a section 16 appeal shall include the following particulars-

(a) full name and address of the appellant;

(b) the address of the relevant chargeable dwelling, if different from the address referred to in sub-paragraph (a);

(c) the date on which the written notice under section 16(4)(a) of the 1992 Act was served and the name of the authority on which it was served;

(d) the date, if applicable, on which the appellant was notified by the authority in accordance with section 16(7)(a) or (b) of the 1992 Act;

(e) the grounds on which the appellant is aggrieved;

(f) brief reasons why the appellant considers that the decision or calculation made by the authority was incorrect; and

(g) where the appellant has also made an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal in accordance with the Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations 2001 3 and the appeal raises common issues of fact with the appeal made under section 16 of the 1992 Act, a statement to that effect.'

Note, if a taxpayer attempts to appeal to the VTE before undertaking section 16(7) pre-issue process, the VTE will refuse to register the VTE 'appeal'. If a taxpayer attempts to appeal to the VTE but does not include in the paperwork, a copy of the billing authority's final decision/final reconsideration notice (with 'right to appeal the decision' notice text - see below), the VTE will ask for a copy and indicate that unless the VTE hear from the taxpayer within 14 days, the VTE will assume that the appeal to the VTE is no longer pursued.  

The VTE will likely say:

'If you have not received a final decision notice yet, you will not be able to make an appeal to us at this time and may I suggest you contact the council to submit your appeal. You can appeal a council tax decision with your council firstly by writing to them and appealing as an aggrieved person under Section 16 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992. You must confirm the decision you are appealing against, the outcome you are looking for and give evidence to support your request. The council will respond to appeals within two months with a final decision or final reconsideration notice. This notice will outline the decision they have reached and specifically give you a right of appeal to come to the Valuation Tribunal Service if you remain unhappy.
 
If you have received the final decision notice, please may I take this opportunity to remind you that you have two months from the date you received it in which you can appeal to us and can you please send me a copy of the decision.'

Separately, the 'right to appeal the decision' notice text, which may be contained in the billing authority final decision / final reconsideration notice, might read something like the following:

'You have the right to Appeal this decision. To do so you must make an application to the Valuation Tribunal Service within 2 months of the date of this letter. If made later than 2 months the Valuation Tribunal Service may ask for the reasons for the late appeal and refuse your application if they deem the reasons unsatisfactory.

The Valuation Tribunal Service is an independent body set up in order to resolve disputes of this kind. They will set a date for a hearing whereby both parties will provide evidence to substantiate their claims. A decision will then be made based on that hearing.'

The letter might also: (1) provided contact details for the VTE and (2) reminded the taxpayer of his/her obligation to pay the amounts of council tax demanded by the billing authority, notwithstanding his appeal, and that (3) he/she will be refunded any overpayment to the extent the appeal was successful.

[11b] In Lone v Hounslow LBC [2020] 1 WLR 952 ('Lone'), Arnold LJ said, at paragraph 32:

'Appeals to the Valuation Tribunal under section 16 are subject to the time limits set out in regulation 21 of the Valuation Tribunal for England (Council Tax and Rating Appeals) (Procedure) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/2269) ("the 2009 Regulations"):

"(1) Paragraphs (2) to (5) are subject to paragraph (6).

"(2) The VTE shall dismiss an appeal by a person in relation to whom the condition mentioned in section 16(7)(a) or (b) of the 1992 Act is fulfilled unless the appeal is initiated within two months of the date of service of the billing authority's notice under that section.

"(3) Where the condition mentioned in section 16(7)(c) of the 1992 Act is fulfilled, the VTE shall dismiss an appeal by an aggrieved person unless the appeal is initiated within four months of the date of service of the person's notice under section 16(4).

"(4) ...

"(5) ...

"(6) The VTE President may authorise an appeal to be entertained where the VTE President is satisfied that the failure of the person aggrieved to initiate the appeal as provided by this regulation has arisen by reason of circumstances beyond that person's control."'

So, if the time limit for appealing to the Valuation Tribunal of England ('VTE') is missed (as applicable, reg.21(2) or reg.21(3), as the case may be), then the VTE must dismiss the appeal to it, unless the VTE's President is satisfied that the failre to initiate the appeal in time, was 'by reason of circumstances beyond that person's control'.

In the case of Sabesan v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2018] EWHC 2373 (Admin)('Sabesan'), Mr Edward Murray sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, considered:

(1) the VTE President refusing to authorise an appeal brought under regulation 21(6) of the 2009 Regulations i.e. a (first) appeal to the VTE (lodged 3 months after the 2 month deadline (paragraph 7)) - and a request to the VTE for that decision to be reviewed, being rejected (paragraph 9); and

(2) the taxpayer's (second) appeal, against the VTE President refusal to authorise an out of time (first) appeal to the VTE (the second appeal lodged 5 months after the 4 week deadline expired (paragraph 14)).

Just on issue (2) for moment, it should be noted that appeals against VTE decisions, are governed by regulation 43 of the 2009 Regulations. Arnold LJ in Lone said, at paragraph 36:

'An appeal lies to the High Court on a question of law arising out of a decision or order of the Valuation Tribunal on an appeal under section 16 of the 1992 Act: see regulation 43 of the 2009 Regulations.'

Returning to Sabesan, the Deputy High Court Judge in Sabesan, under the subheading 'Statutory Background', set out the basic stages, at paragraphs 11 and 12:

'[the taxpayer's] appeal to the VTE was made under section 16 of the 1992 Act, but was not initiated within the two-month period specified in regulation 21(2) of the 2009 Regulations, which is applicable to his case. Regulation 21(2) provides that the time limit for an appeal to the VTE under section 16 of the 1992 Act is two months where the condition in section 16(7) (a) of the 1992 Act is satisfied, namely, where the appellant has been notified in writing by the relevant authority ... that his grievance (in this case, his objection to liability for council tax in respect of the Property having been imposed upon him) is not well-founded, but the person remains aggrieved. The notification satisfying this condition was the letter ...from [the billing authority] to [the taxpayer]...

Under regulation 21(6) of the 2009 Regulations, the President of the VTE may authorise an appeal to be entertained where the President is satisfied that the failure to initiate the appeal within the two-month period "has arisen by reason of circumstances beyond that person's control". Part 2 section PS1 (Extensions of time for making appeals) of the Consolidated Practice Statement for the Valuation Tribunal for England 2017 (as amended), effective 1 July 2017 ("the VTE Practice Direction"), deals with extensions of time for making appeals. Under paragraph 4 of section PS1, an application under regulation 21 will be considered by or on behalf of the President by a "Senior Member" of the VTE, which term includes a Vice-President. In this case, [the taxpayer's] application under regulation 21 was considered ...a Vice-President of the VTE. [The taxpayer] requested a review by the President of the VTE of [the Vice-President's] decision under regulation 40 of the 2009 Regulations. His request was rejected...'

Though separately, readers might be interested to read what the Deputy High Court Judge in Sabesan said about the principles governing when the High Court will grant an extension of time, to permit a second appeal (from a first appeal decision of the VTE) to be pursued. In particular, the Deputy High Court Judge in Sabesan considered whether the Denton principles (from Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906, [2014] 1 W.L.R. 3926) apply to applications for an extension of time to bring a second appeal.

He considered:

(1) Jagoo v Bristol City Council [2017] EWHC 926 (Admin), a decision of Holroyde J; and

(2) Paul Turner v South Cambridgeshire District Council [2016] EWHC 1017 (Admin), a decision of Warby J, and decided that '...the approach taken by Warby J in the Turner case is the correct one.' (paragraph 24).

The Deputy High Court Judge said:

(1) 'Mr Justice Warby was ... considering an application for an extension of time to appeal under regulation 43 of the 2009 Regulations' (paragraph 20) and '...Warby J concluded at [7] that "[t]he Denton criteria are applicable [to such an application], either directly or by analogy"'. (paragraph 20);

(2) at paragraph 21:

'Warby J says the following at [24] on the question of the principles that apply to an application for an extension of time under regulation 43 and the question of relief from sanctions:

"It is clear that Regulation 43 gives the Court a discretion to dismiss an appeal made out of time. The Regulation can be analysed as imposing a time limit which may be extended only if the court in its discretion agrees; or an automatic sanction from which relief must be sought; or as a ground on which the court may in its discretion dismiss an appeal. I do not believe it matters. The general rule is that appeal courts treat an application to extend time for appealing, when brought after the time limit has expired, as equivalent to an application for relief from sanctions from CPR 3.9 ; the court applies what have become known as the Mitchell / Denton principles. Sayers v Clarke Walker (A firm) [2002] EWCA Civ 645, [2002] 1 WLR 3095 ; R (Hysaj) v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 1633; [2015] 1 WLR 2472 . It is common ground that in this case I should adopt that approach, and I agree that is appropriate."' [bold added]

(3) at paragraph 25:

'I believe that the correctness of the approach taken by Warby J in Turner as set out at [24] of his judgment in that case is reinforced by the general approach taken by the Court of Appeal to the question of compliance with procedural rules applicable to tribunals in BPP Holdings Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners (Practice Note) [2016] EWCA Civ 121; [2016] 1 WLR 1915. In relation to an application for extension of time in the context of tribunal proceedings, Lord Justice Ryder in BPP Holdings case referred at [44] to the judgment of Mr Justice Morgan, sitting in the Upper Tribunal Tax and Chancery Chamber in the case of Data Select Limited v HMRC [2012] STC 2195, where Morgan J applied CPR 3.9 by analogy to the application for extension of time made by HMRC in that case. The Data Select case, of course, pre-dates the Denton and Hysaj cases, but it indicates a consistent approach.' [bold added]

Readers might also want to consider Rohde v Herefordshire Council [2016] EWHC 2407 (Admin); [2017] R.V.R. 69.

[12] Two points here

[1] The '2009 Regulations' is a reference to 'Valuation Tribunal for England (Council Tax and Rating Appeals) (Procedure) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/2269)'. Those 2009 Regulations apply only to England and came into force on 1 October 2009.

For completeness, the full regulation 38 of the 2009 Regulations, entitled 'Orders other than consent orders', reads:

'(1) After dealing with a section 16 appeal the VTE may by order require-

(a) an estimate to be quashed or altered;

(b) a penalty to be quashed;

(c) the decision of a billing authority to be reversed; or

(d) a calculation (other than an estimate) of an amount to be quashed and the amount to be re-calculated.

(2) After dealing with an appeal under regulation 10 of the CT Regulations (disagreement as to proposed alteration) the VTE may, subject to paragraph (3), by order require a LO to alter a list in accordance with any provision made by or under the 1992 Act.

(3) Where it is decided that the valuation band applicable to the dwelling should be higher than-

(a) the valuation band shown in the list at the date of the proposal; and

(b) the valuation band contended for in the proposal,

the VTE must order the LO to alter the list with effect from the day on which the VTE panel made the decision; and the LO must so alter the list, notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in regulation 11 of the CT Regulations (day from which alteration has effect).

(4) After dealing with a NDR appeal, the VTE may, subject to paragraph (6), by order require a VO to alter a list in accordance with any provision made by or under the 1988 Act.

(5) Subject to paragraph (7), where it is decided that a disputed rateable value should be an amount greater than-

(a) the amount shown in the list at the date of the proposal; and

(b) the amount proposed by the appellant,

the VTE must order the VO to alter the list with effect from the day on which the VTE Panel made the decision.

(6) Paragraph (5) does not apply where the order requires the VO to alter the list to show-

(a) property previously rated as a single hereditament becoming liable to be rated in parts, or

(b) property previously liable to be rated in parts becoming liable to be rated as a single hereditament, or

(c) any part of a hereditament becoming part of a different hereditament.

(7) Where it appears that circumstances giving rise to an alteration ordered by the VTE have ceased to exist, the order may require the alteration to be made in respect of such period as appears to the VTE to reflect the duration of those circumstances.

(7A) After dealing with an appeal against imposition of a CT penalty, the VTE may by order require a penalty to be quashed.

(8) After dealing with an appeal against the imposition of a CT penalty or a Schedule 9 penalty, the VTE may order the LO or, as the case may be, the VO whose notice is the subject of the appeal to reduce or remit the penalty.

(8A) After dealing with an appeal under regulation 9C of the NDR Regulations against the imposition of a Part 2 penalty, the VTE may order the VO to remit the penalty in full.

(8B) After dealing with an appeal by a person under regulation 9C of the NDR Regulations against the amount of a Part 2 penalty, the VTE may order the VO to reduce the amount of penalty payable to £200 if the VTE determines that the person was a smaller proposer.

(8C) In this regulation, "Part 2 penalty" has the meaning given in the NDR Regulations.

(9) The billing authority, the LO or the VO (as the case may be) must comply with an order under this regulation within two weeks of the day of its making.

(10) An order under this regulation may require any matter ancillary to its subject matter to be attended to.'

[2] is the Valuation Tribunal's power to order the repayment of an amount that has been overpaid. In Lone v Hounslow LBC [2020] 1 WLR 952, Arnold LJ said, at paragraph 35:

'Although it is slightly curious that regulation 38 of the 2009 Regulations does not explicitly provide that the Valuation Tribunal may make an order for repayment of an amount that has been overpaid, it is clear from paragraph 10A of Part 3 to Schedule 11 to the 1988 Act that it can do so as an "ancillary" matter. The important point for present purposes is that the legislation proceeds upon the basis that the primary remedy which the Valuation Tribunal will make in favour of a taxpayer who successfully contends that they have been overcharged is an order requiring the billing authority to recalculate the amount due. Repayment is only an ancillary remedy. Consistently with this, it appears from a number of decisions which we were shown that the tribunal's usual practice is simply to order recalculation and not to order repayment.'

[13] To set those two provisions out (before The Non-Domestic Rating (Alteration of Lists and Appeals) (England) Regulations 2009):

(1) Regulation 23(1) of the the Non-Domestic Rating (Collection and Enforcement) (Local Lists) Regulations 1989 (SI 1989/1058) ('1989 Regulations'); 

'Any matter which could be the subject of an appeal under regulations under section 55 of the Act may not be raised in proceedings under this Part.'

Regulation 23 appears in Part III of the 1989 Regulations. Part III is entitled 'enforcement' and contains regulations 10 to 23 inclusive. Amongst other things, Part III contains all the provisions about seeking a business rates liability order. 

(2) section 55 of the Local Government Finance Act 1988 ('1988 Act'). Section 55 is entitled 'Alteration of lists' and reads:

'(1) The Secretary of State may make regulations providing that where a copy of a list has been sent under section 41(5) or 52(5) above and the valuation officer alters the list before it comes into force-

(a) the officer must inform the billing authority or Secretary of State (as the case may be), and

(b) the authority or Secretary of State (as the case may be) must alter the deposited copy accordingly.

(2) The Secretary of State may make regulations about the alteration by valuation officers of lists which have been compiled under this Part, whether or not they are still in force; and subsections (3) to (7) below shall apply for the purposes of this subsection.

(3) The regulations may include provision that where a valuation officer intends to alter a list with a view to its being accurately maintained, he shall not alter it unless prescribed conditions (as to notice or otherwise) are fulfilled.

(4) The regulations may include provision-

(a) as to who (other than a valuation officer) may make a proposal for the alteration of a list with a view to its being accurately maintained,

(b) as to the manner and circumstances in which a proposal may be made,

(c) as to the period within which a proposal must be made,

(d) as to the procedure for and subsequent to the making of a proposal, and

(dd) as to the circumstances within which and the conditions upon which a proposal may be withdrawn

(e) requiring the valuation officer to inform other prescribed persons of the proposal in a prescribed manner.

(4A) In relation to an English list or a Welsh list, the provision that may be included in the regulations by virtue of subsection (4) includes-

(a) provision about the steps that must be taken before a person may make a proposal for an alteration of the list (which may include steps designed to ensure the person checks the accuracy and completeness of any information on which any decision by the valuation officer has been based and gives the valuation officer an opportunity to consider the results of those checks and alter the list);

(b) provision restricting the circumstances in which any of those steps may be taken and provision about the timing of any step;

(c) provision for valuation officers to impose financial penalties on persons who, in, or in connection with, proposals for the alteration of the list, knowingly, recklessly or carelessly provide information which is false in a material particular. (4B) If provision is made by virtue of subsection (4A)(c)-

(a) the maximum amount of any penalty that may be specified in, or determined in accordance with, the regulations is £500;

(b) the regulations must require any sum received by a valuation officer by way of penalty to be paid into the appropriate fund;

(c) the regulations may include provision for any penalty to be recovered by the valuation officer concerned as a civil debt due to the officer;

(d) the regulations must include provision enabling a person on whom a financial penalty is imposed to appeal against the imposition of the penalty or its amount to the valuation tribunal.

(5) The regulations may include provision that, where there is a disagreement [between a valuation officer and another person making a proposal for the alteration of a list-

(a) about the validity of the proposal; or

(b) about the accuracy of the list

an appeal may be made to a valuation tribunal;

(5A) In relation to a proposal made by a person to alter an English list or a Welsh list, the provision that may be included in regulations by virtue of subsection (5) includes provision-

(a) about the grounds on which an appeal may be made;

(b) about the matters which are not to be taken into account by the valuation tribunal as part of an appeal;

(c) about the circumstances in which new evidence may be admitted on an appeal, and about the conduct of an appeal in relation to such evidence;

(d) about the payment of fees by ratepayers in relation to appeals, the payment of those fees into the appropriate fund and the circumstances in which those fees are to be refunded.

This subsection is without prejudice to the powers to make regulations conferred by Part 3 of Schedule 11 (tribunals: procedure, orders, etc).

(6) The regulations may include-

(a) provision as to the period for which or day from which an alteration of a list is to have effect (including provision that it is to have retrospective effect);

(b) provision requiring the list to be altered so as to indicate the effect (retrospective or otherwise) of the alteration;

(c) provision requiring the valuation officer to inform prescribed persons of an alteration within a prescribed period;

(d) provision requiring the valuation officer to keep for a prescribed period a record of the state of the list before the alteration was made.

(7) The regulations may include provision as to financial adjustments to be made as a result of alterations, including—

(a) provision requiring payments or repayments to be made, with or without interest, and

(c) provision as to the recovery (by deduction or otherwise) of sums due.

(7A) The regulations may include provision that—

(a) where a valuation officer for a billing authority has informed the authority of an alteration of a list a copy of which has been deposited by the authority under section 41(6B) or 41A(10) above, the authority must alter the copy accordingly;

(b) where the central valuation officer has informed the Secretary of State of an alteration of a list a copy of which has been deposited under section 52(6B) above, the Secretary of State must alter the copy accordingly.

(7B) For the purposes of subsections (4B)(b) and (5A)(d) “the appropriate fund” means-

(a) where the provision made by virtue of subsection (4A)(c) or (5) is in relation to a proposal to alter an English list, the Consolidated Fund, and

(b) where the provision made by virtue of subsection (4A)(c) or (5) is in relation to a proposal to alter a Welsh list, the Welsh Consolidated Fund.

(8) In this section“English list” means-

(a) a local non-domestic rating list that has to be compiled for a billing authority in England, or

(b) the central non-domestic rating list that has to be compiled for England; “valuation tribunal” means-

(a) in relation to England, the Valuation Tribunal for England;

(b) in relation to Wales, a valuation tribunal established under paragraph 1 of Schedule 11; “Welsh list” means-

(a) a local non-domestic rating list that has to be compiled for a billing authority in Wales, or

(b) the central non-domestic rating list that has to be compiled for Wales.'

(3) We now come to the The Non-Domestic Rating (Alteration of Lists and Appeals) (England) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009//2268) ('2009 Regulations') themselves. 

The Explanatory Note, which does not form part of the 2009 Regulations, contains the following:

'These Regulations are primarily concerned with the alteration of local and central non-domestic rating lists, which are compiled under the 1988 Act. They cover the alteration of non-domestic rating lists by valuation officers, proposals for such alterations from other persons and appeals to the VTE where there is disagreement about a proposal between the valuation officer and another person.

Part 1 of the Regulations (regulations 1 and 2) contains definitions of terms used in the Regulations.

In Part 2:

regulation 3 defines terms used in Part 2,

regulation 4 sets out the circumstances in which proposals to alter the list may be made,

regulation 5 specifies the time limits within which proposals are to be made,

regulation 6 sets out the content of proposals,

regulations 7 to 13 provide the procedures to be followed by valuation officers in relation to proposals,

regulation 14 provides for the determination of the effective date of any alteration made,

regulation 15 makes special provision in relation to advertising hoardings,

regulation 16 requires the effective date of any alteration to be shown in the list, and

regulation 17 makes provision for the notification of any alteration, and

In Part 3, regulation 18 applies Part 2, with modifications, to hereditaments shown on the central non-domestic rating lists.

In Part 4, regulation 19 sets out the procedure for appeals against building completion notices and the imposition of penalty notices. Regulation 20 reproduces, in an amended form to reflect the establishment of the VTE, paragraph (7) of regulation 17A of the 2005 Regulations which was inserted by S.I. 2006/2313. (With the exception of regulation 20 and regulation 23(3) mentioned below, regulation 17A is spent and is not reproduced in these Regulations.)

Regulation 21 requires valuation officers to give notice to billing authorities or the Secretary of State of certain applications to the VTE or appeals to the Upper Tribunal (which has superseded the Lands Tribunal), and to notify the VTE of appeals to the Upper Tribunal. Billing authorities are also required to notify the VTE of appeals made to the Upper Tribunal as regards decisions or orders relevant to completion notices.

In Part 5, regulation 22 makes provision for the giving or service of notices. Regulation 23 deals with the retention of records by valuation officers and includes, in paragraph (3), provision comparable to that in regulation 17A(8) of the 2005 Regulations. Regulation 24 prescribes information to be supplied by authorities for the purposes of paragraph 6(1A) of Schedule 9 to the Act...'

[14] In Hackney Borough Council v Mott and Fairman [1994] Rating Appeals 381; [1994] 6 WLUK 64, Auld J seemingly adopted counsel's suggestions of what might be deployable defences/objections in the Magistrates Court, by a alleged ratepayer, when faced with a complaint/summons for a business rates liability order, at 388:

'[counsel for the billing authority] has helpfully identified certain matters, five in all, which, on the authorities, may constitute valid objections before magistrates to the making of a liability order in reliance on an entry in the rating list. They are: 1) where the property is not within the charging authority's area, Mayor of Westminster v. Army & Navy Auxiliary Co-operative Supply [1902] 2 KB 125; 2) where the person charged is not the occupier (or the owner in the case of unoccupied premises), Mayor of Westminster case, supra; 3) where the rate has not been lawfully demanded, Mansel v. Itchen Overseers [1906] 1 KB 221; 4) where 6 years have elapsed since the rate became due, China v. Harrow Urban District Council [1954] 1 QB 178; and 5) where the rate has already been paid in full, Shillito v. Hinchcliffe [1922] 2 KB 236. The failure to serve a proper notice of an alteration has not been identified as a valid objection. Indeed, the cases to which I have referred, in all of which complaint was made in one way or another, of inadequate notice, are against it. The rationale for that, as [counsel for the billing authority] summarised it in argument, is that any failure of the valuation officer to give due notice of an alteration does not go to the entitlement of the rating authority to seek a liability order but to the validity of an entry in the list, which is not a matter for magistrates.'

[15] In Oyston v Blackpool Council [2024] EWHC 1224 (Admin), Turner J reviewed the authorities in this area. While it is a substantial extract, it is a useful review to quote:

'6. Section 16 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 provides that:

“A person may appeal to a valuation tribunal if he is aggrieved by - (a) any decision of a billing authority that a dwelling is a chargeable dwelling, or that he is liable to pay council tax in respect of such a dwelling; or (b) any calculation made by such an authority of an amount which he is liable to pay to the authority in respect of council tax.”

7. This case concerns the appellant's grievances as to whether The Penthouse is a chargeable dwelling or whether he is liable to pay council tax in respect of it. His contentions thus fall squarely within section 16. It follows that a route to appeal lay to a Valuation Tribunal.

8. Regulation 57(1) of the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992, as amended by regulation 19(a) of the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) (Amendment) Regulations 1992, states:

“Any matter which could be the subject of an appeal under section 16 of the Act or regulations under section 24 of the Act may not be raised in proceedings under this Part.”

9. The proceedings to which the regulation relates are enforcement proceedings before a magistrates' court.

10. The consequences of the application of these provisions has been considered in a line of authorities the first of which is Salmon v Feltham Magistrates’ Court [2008] EWHC (Admin) 3507. In that case, the claimant challenged his liability to pay council tax before the magistrates’ court on the grounds that the property in question was, contrary to the findings of the justices, not in multiple occupation. Stadlen J held:

“40. … the primary submission of Mr Choudhury on this matter… is that the question of whether in fact the property was a house of multiple occupation such as to satisfy the statutory criteria is irrelevant, not only for the purposes of this court but also for the purposes of the Magistrates' Court. That is because paragraph 57(1) of the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992 provides:

“Any matter which could be the subject of an appeal under section 16 of the Act or regulations under section 24 of the Act may not be raised in proceedings under this Part.”

“This Part” is a reference to Part 6 of the Regulations which deal with enforcement and include section 34, which empower the billing authority to apply to a Magistrates' Court for an order against the person by whom an amount is payable by virtue of a notice having not been complied with.

41. Section 16 of the Act provides:

“(1) A person may appeal to a valuation tribunal if he is aggrieved by-

(a) any decision of a billing authority that a dwelling is a chargeable dwelling, or that he is liable to pay council tax in respect of such a dwelling.”

42. Thus, the decision by the local authority that Mr Salmon was liable to pay council tax in respect of the first and second floor property, and the decision that that was because it was a house in multiple occupation, was a decision which he had a right under section 16 to appeal against to a valuation tribunal if aggrieved. Indeed, he was notified of the existence of that right in this very case but told me that he did not avail himself of that right in respect of this period, that is to say 2007/2008, prior to the summons or the date of the hearing in front of the Magistrates. If it were indeed the case that it was not for the purposes of 2007/2008 a house in multiple occupation for the purposes of the Act, then he would have had a right to appeal to a valuation tribunal on that ground and on that ground, had it been accepted by the Tribunal, the decision of the defendant that he is liable to pay council tax for 2007/2008 would have been overturned.

43. In those circumstances, I do not have the slightest doubt that that is a matter which could be the subject of an appeal under section 16 and therefore that by virtue of paragraph 57 of the Regulations it is a matter that could not be raised in the proceedings in front of the Magistrates' Court for non-payment of the sums contained in the demand and the arrears notice. In those circumstances, it seems to me that this ground of appeal is hopelessly misconceived.

44. I raised with Mr Choudhury in argument the question of whether, if Mr Salmon was right that he was entitled to raise this point in front of the Magistrates, then would the relevant point of inquiry in relation to the findings of the Magistrates' Court be on the question of whether they were right to find that it was a house in multiple occupation or rather that it had been so designated by the local authority. The mere statement of those alternative questions demonstrates how misconceived this ground of appeal or application is because it is simply not part of the function of the Magistrates' Court in hearing a summons such as that in this case to go behind the making of the demand notice to inquire into the validity of such an underlying decision as whether the defendant to the summons is the person liable to pay council tax for the property in respect of that period for that amount. Those are matters in respect of which, if there is a sense of grievance, the defendant is entitled to exercise his right of appeal to the Tribunal.”

11. The same issue arose in the later case of Shah v Croydon [2013] EWHC 3657 (Admin) in which Andrews J (as she then was) held:

“45. It was then submitted by Mr Zwart that by virtue of paragraph 57(1) of the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992, (“the Enforcement Regulations”) the magistrates were not entitled to even go into the question of whether this property was a House in Multiple Occupation, because this was a matter exclusively for the Valuation Tribunal. In addressing the question, the magistrates had exceeded their jurisdiction, and thus he had to concede the third ground of the Appeal (which I have not thus far addressed in this judgment. On that basis Mr Zwart submitted that the Court need not make any findings on the other grounds of appeal.

46. Paragraph 57, which is under the heading “Miscellaneous Provisions” provides as follows:

i.“1. Any matter which could be the subject of an appeal under section 16 of the Act may not be raised in proceedings under this part.”

47. I therefore have to consider what may be the subject of an appeal under section 16 of the Act. Section 16 provides that:

“(a): An appeal lies to the Valuation Tribunal against a decision of the billing authority that a dwelling is chargeable or that a person is liable to pay council tax in respect of it, or, (b), against any calculation of an amount that is payable by way of council tax.”

48. If the argument of the Respondent were right in terms of the interpretation of that provision of the Enforcement Regulation, it would mean that the scope of enquiry of the magistrates on any occasion when they were asked to make an enforcement order would be exceedingly narrow. They could not embark on any consideration of whether the dwelling was in fact chargeable to council tax, whether the person from whom the tax was demanded was liable, or whether the sum demanded had been properly calculated. If they made a liability order on an entirely false premise, the defendant would have to go to the Valuation Tribunal for redress.

49. The ability of a local authority to apply for a liability order is set out in the Enforcement Regulations at paragraph 34, and that provides:

“If an amount which is fallen due under regulation 23(3) or 23(4) is wholly or partly unpaid, or in a case where a final notice is required under regulation 33 , the amount stated in the final notice is wholly or partly unpaid at the expiry of 7 days beginning with the day on which the notice was issued, the billing authority may, in accordance with paragraph 2, apply to a Magistrates' Court for an order against the person by whom it is payable.”

50. Pausing there, the word “may” means that it is in the discretion of the billing authority to decide whether to make such an application to the Magistrates' Court. The remainder of the paragraph deals with how the application then proceeds before the magistrates.

51. Sub-paragraph 6 provides:

i. “The court shall make the order if it is satisfied that the sum has become payable by the defendant and has not been paid.”

52. It follows therefore, as a matter of plain English, that in order to be able to make such an order, the magistrates must be satisfied: (a) that the specific sum which is being claimed has become payable, (b) that it has not been paid, and (c) that the person who is liable to pay it is the defendant. It cannot possibly reach that conclusion without considering the calculation of the amount, or any other matter or factor which goes to the question of whether or not the right person is being asked to pay.

53. The construction that is being placed on paragraph 57 by the Respondent would preclude the magistrates from doing that, so it cannot be the correct construction. One has to construe regulations in a way that make sense. The obvious intention of Parliament in paragraph 57 is to stop the dissatisfied owner, tenant, or other person who is being charged with council tax from initiating a complaint that he should not pay in front of the magistrates, instead of going to the Valuation Tribunal. That is why it says that any matter which could be the subject of an appeal under section 16 may not be raised in proceedings under this part. The person who would raise the matter by way of any such appeal is the person who is dissatisfied, and he would be raising it by way of complaint that he should not pay it: but it is one thing to stop somebody from initiating a complaint before the magistrates, and quite another to stop him from defending himself in circumstances where he says that the local authority has not been able to provide satisfactory evidence that he is the person who is liable.

54. For that reason I do not accept Mr Zwart's submission on instructions that the magistrates had no jurisdiction to entertain these matters. On the contrary, they were matters which they were obliged to take into account in determining whether or not Mr Shah was in fact liable to pay the money that was being sought by way of a liability order. It was quite proper for them to do that. It was not a case of Mr Shah going to the magistrates and saying: “I am not liable.”

55. Therefore, for that reason, I conclude that the magistrates were acting within their jurisdiction when they looked at these matters, and that they were entitled to take these matters into account but, for the reasons I have already given in this judgment, the conclusion that they reached was wrong in law. Consequently the decision to make the liability order has to be quashed, and this appeal is successful.”

12. It is to be noted that the judge in Shah was not referred to the decision in Salmon. Had she been so then she would no doubt have paid due regard to the observations of Lord Goddard CJ in Police Authority for Huddersfield v Watson [1947] KB 842 at 848 :

“I can only say for myself that I think the modern practice, and the modern view of the subject, is that a judge of first instance, though he would always follow the decision of another judge of first instance, unless he is convinced the judgment is wrong, would follow it as a matter of judicial comity.”

13. More recently, in Willers v Joyce [2016] UKSC 44 , Lord Neuberger said at [9]:

“So far as the High Court is concerned, puisne judges are not technically bound by decisions of their peers, but they should generally follow a decision of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction unless there is a powerful reason for not doing so.”

14. In Wiltshire Council v Piggin [2014] EWHC 4386 (Admin) William Davis J (as he then was) had to choose between the two conflicting first instance authorities. He held:

“16. The Council's argument is that the matter is really determined by a combination of section 16 of the 1992 Act and regulation 57(1) of the 1992 regulations. Section 16 provides as follows:

i. “A person may appeal to a valuation tribunal if he is aggrieved by –

(b) any decision of a billing authority that a dwelling is a chargeable dwelling, or that he is liable to pay council tax in respect of such a dwelling; or

(c) any calculation made by such an authority of an amount which he is liable to pay to the authority in respect of council tax.”

17. There is no doubt that this case concerns Mr Piggin's grievance as to whether he is “liable to pay council tax.” Therefore, his contention appears to fall squarely within section 16. It follows that he may appeal to a Valuation Tribunal. As a matter of fact, he did just that. As already noted, the appeal was still awaiting hearing at the time of the hearing before the Magistrates' Court. I now know that it has reached a conclusion. I have not seen the decision of the Tribunal. It is not relevant to my consideration of this case to see the decision at all and I have not done so.

18. Regulation 57(1) of the 1992 regulations states as follows:

i. “Any matter which could be the subject of an appeal under section 16 of the Act may not be raised in proceedings under this part.”

19. The proceedings to which the regulation relates are enforcement proceedings before a Magistrates' Court.

20. In the hearing in the Magistrates' Court, Mr Piggin argued that he was not liable for the outstanding council tax because the property was owned by a trust. Thus, the argument is his argument before the lower court fell clearly within the scope of section 16(1). Therefore, by virtue of regulation 57 this was a matter that could have been determined by way of an appeal to the Valuation Tribunal and was not in those circumstances a matter that could be raised by way of defence in proceedings in the Magistrates' Court.

21. This court has considered that issue on at least two previous occasions. The decision in R (on the application of John Stuart Salmon) v Feltham Magistrates' Court [2008] EWHC 3507 (Admin) supports the argument raised by the Appellant in this case. The decision in Mahendra Shah v London Borough of Croydon [2013] EWHC 3657 (Admin) supports the argument put by Mr Piggin. In particular, it supports the argument that it would in essence not be fair to bar Mr Piggin for raising these matters before the magistrates.

22. Miss Harrison on behalf of the Appellant in this case accepted before me that neither decision is binding on me. When Andrews J made her decision she apparently was not referred to the case of Salmon , but it is not suggested that the decision in Shah was per incuriam for that reason. It follows that I am in a position to reach the view that I think is appropriate bearing in mind the words of the statute and the regulation.

23. I conclude that regulation 57(1) of the 1992 regulations establishes clearly and unequivocally that the substantive merits of the billing authority's decision in terms of the chargeability of the dwelling, which is not this case, or the liability of the individual, which is this case, those matters are matters for the Valuation Tribunal. They “may not be raised” in the enforcement proceedings.

24. Mr Piggin is in general terms entirely correct. A Magistrates' Court is there to dispense justice, but a Magistrates' Court has jurisdiction in particular cases depending upon the extent of that jurisdiction as provided by statute. In this case, the statute is entirely plain. The substantive issues are to be raised before the Tribunal. They may not be raised in the enforcement proceedings.

25. It follows that the magistrates in this case made an error in law in permitting Mr Piggin to raise the issue to argue it and then to find in his favour. They simply did not have the jurisdiction to do so. That disposes of the substantive part of the appeal.”

15. The next decision to be considered is that of Okon v London Borough of Lewisham [2016] EWHC 864 (Ch) in which the appellant faced a bankruptcy petition presented by the respondent in respect of liability orders made by the magistrates relating to unpaid council tax. She sought to persuade the magistrates’ court to set aside the orders on the grounds, inter alia, that the properties in respect of which they had been made were tenanted. She, however, faced the Piggins jurisdictional hurdle. The matter found its way to the High Court where the Deputy Judge held:

“On 29 May 2015, that is to say the week before the adjourned hearing of the bankruptcy petition, the Applicant and Respondent were back in court against each other, this time at the Bromley Magistrates Court at the hearing of the Respondent's proceedings seeking the making of fresh Liability Orders against the Applicant. Miss Bailey appeared again for the Applicant and submitted that her client was not liable on the facts for the council tax in question. I accept for present purposes that it came as a rude shock to Miss Bailey, therefore, for the Court to accept the Respondent's submissions on that occasion, with Mr. Sayer in attendance, that the court had no power to go into the substantive merits: it only had power to consider whether the Respondent had followed the correct procedure in making the application for Liability Orders and that a challenge to the merits of the liability order had to be raised by way of an appeal to the Valuation Tribunal. I accept for present purposes that this was not appreciated by anybody who participated at the first hearing of the bankruptcy petition on 3 February 2015.

As a result of this hearing, Miss Bailey realised that her client, the Applicant, may well be barking up the wrong tree in trying to set aside the Liability Orders, and that she should perhaps instead be making an application to the Valuation Tribunal by way of an appeal against them. The Applicant's appropriate remedy turns upon the true construction of certain important provisions in the 1992 Regulations, namely section 16 of the 1992 Act and reg. 57(1) of the 1992 Regulations. Section 16 provides that a person aggrieved by "any decision of a billing authority that a dwelling is a chargeable dwelling, or that he is liable to pay council tax in respect of such a dwelling" may appeal to the valuation tribunal. And reg. 57(1) provides that any "matter which could be the subject of an appeal under section 16 of the Act may not be raised in proceedings under this part [i.e. Part VI: Enforcement which includes reg. 34 (Application for liability order)]". The courts have reached divergent views as to whether reg. 57(1) is effective to bar the council tax payer from raising the substantive merits before the Magistrates Court in proceedings for the making of liability orders, but it seems to me to be clear (and it is indeed now common ground between the parties, as appears from paragraph 16 of the Respondent's supplemental Skeleton Argument) that it does have this effect, and I propose to follow the recent but relatively unknown decision on this point of Mr Justice William Davis, in Wiltshire Council v. Piggin [2014] EWHC 4386 (Admin). I say this decision is relatively unknown because neither counsel appearing before me had any knowledge of it until Miss Bailey found it and cited it to me on the second day of submissions before me.”

16. The decision of the Deputy Judge on costs went to the Court of Appeal in Okon v London Borough of Lewisham [2017] EWCA Civ 1973. The Court proceeded on the basis that the “Piggin point” was validly taken but without any independent analysis or appraisal.

17. Of greater assistance to this court is the case of Lone v Hounslow London Borough Council [2020] 1 W.L.R. 952. The claimant in that case sought to recover council tax which he alleged he had overpaid by bringing a claim in the County Court. The Court of Appeal held that the operation of section 16 of the 1992 Act precluded the jurisdiction of the County Court. Arnold LJ observed:

“37. Finally, regulation 57(1) of the 1992 Regulations provides, so far as relevant: “Any matter which could be the subject of appeal under section 16 of the Act … may not be raised in proceedings under this Part [i e Part VI of the Regulations].”

38. This prevents an issue that could be the subject of an appeal to the Valuation Tribunal under section 16 from being relied upon by way of defence to an application by the billing authority in a magistrates’ court for a liability order enforcing the payment of council tax: see Okon v Lewisham London Borough Council [2016] BPIR 958 , para 15.”

And later:

“42. Counsel for the Council submitted that, upon analysis of the statutory scheme, the determination as to whether the taxpayer is entitled to SPD is to be made in the first instance by the billing authority. Initially, the billing authority is required to make reasonable enquiries and then to make an assumption: regulations 14 and 15 of the 1992 Regulations. The taxpayer is under a duty to correct an erroneous assumption: regulation 16 of the 1992 Regulations. Even if the taxpayer is not under a duty by virtue of regulation 16, the taxpayer is plainly at liberty to draw an error to the billing authority's attention. As discussed above, it is then for the billing authority to determine whether any adjustment is required: regulations 24 and 31 of the 1992 Regulations. If the billing authority refuses or neglects to make an adjustment which the taxpayer believes they are entitled to, the taxpayer can appeal to the Valuation Tribunal under section 16(1)(b) of the 1992 Act, subject to compliance with section 16(4), which in essence requires the taxpayer to notify the billing authority of their complaint and give it two months to reconsider the matter, and the time limits in regulation 21 of the 2009 Regulations. If the taxpayer is successful on appeal, the Valuation Tribunal will make an order requiring the billing authority to recalculate the amount of council tax which is due. The Valuation Tribunal may also make an ancillary order for repayment of any sum which has been overpaid. It is only once there has been a determination, either by the billing authority itself under regulations 14 or 31 of the 1992 Regulations or by the Valuation Tribunal on appeal, that a sum should be repaid to the taxpayer, and the billing authority has not paid that sum, that regulation 55 confers jurisdiction on the courts to entertain a claim to recover it.

43. Counsel for the Council acknowledged that there is no provision which expressly states that the jurisdiction of the Valuation Tribunal to determine issues as to the correct amount of council tax payable is exclusive. He submitted, however, that this is implicit in the nature of the Valuation Tribunal's jurisdiction. The Valuation Tribunal is a specialist tribunal. Appeals to it are subject to certain conditions, such as that imposed by section 16(4) and the time limits contained in regulation 21 of the 2009 Regulations. It has its own procedures, and it has no power to make an order for costs (see regulation 12 of the 2009 Regulations). Furthermore, he submitted, this was reinforced by regulation 57 of the 1992 Regulations, which as noted above prevents issues as to the correct amount of council tax payable being raised by way of defence to applications for liability orders. He submitted that it was implicit in this scheme that the County Court had no jurisdiction to determine such issues, as opposed to enforcing an obligation to make repayment which had already arisen either by virtue of the billing authority's own determination or as a result of a decision of the Valuation Tribunal on appeal. If it were otherwise, the conditions and restrictions attendant upon an appeal to the Valuation Tribunal could be circumvented by filing a claim with the County Court. Moreover, if there were concurrent jurisdiction, it would give rise to the risk of inconsistent decisions.

44. In support of this analysis, counsel for the Council relied on the reasoning of Mummery LJ giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the admittedly somewhat different context of claims for the payment of housing benefit in Haringey London Borough Council v Cotter (1996) 29 HLR 682, 688–689.

“The important point about the procedure for determination and for internal and external review is that, pursuant to the authority of primary legislation, the Regulations provide a detailed, self-contained and exhaustive procedure for enforcing the duties of the appropriate local authority in relation to the determination and payment of housing benefits. Until a determination is made under that procedure, there is no duty on the appropriate authority to make a payment of housing benefit either to the claimant entitled to it or to any other person. If there is any dissatisfaction with a determination which has been made, the appropriate procedure for challenging that determination is that laid down in the 1987 Regulations. It is not possible to discern either in the primary legislation or in the detailed Regulations a legislative intention to confer on a claimant or, a fortiori, any other person, a right to enforce by an ordinary private law action a claim for breach of statutory duty in the determination of entitlement to payment of housing benefit.”

45. In my judgment the Council's analysis of the statutory scheme is correct, and it is implicit that the jurisdiction of the Valuation Tribunal to determine the correct amount of council tax payable under section 16(1)(b) of the 1992 Act is exclusive. It follows that the County Court has no jurisdiction over such issues under section 16 of the 1984 Act.”

18. Counsel for the appellant in this case tried valiantly to persuade me that the passages to which I have referred in Lone were the expressions of an obiter view because they related to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the County Court and not that of the magistrates’ court.

19. I cannot agree. There is no plausible basis upon which the jurisdiction of the magistrates’ court could be distinguished from that of the County Court in this context. It follows that I am satisfied that I am bound by the decision in Lone to follow the principle laid down in Piggin.'